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ABSTRACT 
 Knowledge is critical to the advancement of any organization, yet lessons learned 
and after-action reports are insufficient to learn from high-threat events by the homeland 
security enterprise (HSE). What differentiates sub-optimal from meaningful learning is a 
systemic learning culture and emphasis on sensemaking and speed. This thesis examines 
effective organizational learning frameworks that can be applied to the HSE to accelerate 
knowledge acquisition from major events in near real-time. The results demonstrate that 
speed is not inhibitory to the learning process. Recommendations highlight the need for 
adaptive change in how the homeland security environment evolves through the creation 
of an entity responsible for organizational learning. Such an approach would also 
leverage local learning officers to achieve bi-directionality in a novel knowledge 
acquisition process. A new framework for learning must also include a process for near 
real-time data collection and sensemaking, which would require both public-sector 
incubators as well as advocacy networks within a new systematic learning process. This 
approach to organizational learning is required so as not to repeat failures and to enable 
“fast-learning” as threats and threat actors evolve. 
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Knowledge is a limited currency that requires cultivation for the advancement of 
any organization.1 However, homeland security as an enterprise is slow to learn, no matter 
the kind of learning: lessons-learned documents and after-action reports are inadequate for 
the homeland security enterprise to efficiently learn from high-threat events, especially in 
a timely manner.2 The after-action process has been loosely adopted from the military 
experience, and increasing first-responder readiness for future events has been challenging, 
partly because no efficient or standardized way allows such responders to disseminate 
lessons learned from incidents of national significance.3 Nor has any entity articulated a 
process by which either individual or organizational learning might occur in near real-
time.4 Thus, the homeland security enterprise is ill-equipped to learn from major events. 
Violent, high-threat events, such as active-shooter/active-violence incidents, fire as 
a weapon, and responses to explosives, warrant immediate national-level learning for these 
complicated and complex threats given the multi-disciplinary coordination needed for 
mitigation. This is in part because threat actors iterate tactics and aggressors copycat 
incidents. Also, tens of thousands of departments and agencies across the United States 
need to learn simultaneously. The sheer size and diversity of the homeland security 
enterprise and the collective-action problem of who should champion knowledge capture 
                                               
1 Mark Easterby-Smith, Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, 2nd ed. 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 383; Antonio Ramírez and Rodrigo Rojas, “Knowledge Creation, 
Organizational Learning and Their Effects on Organizational Performance,” Inzineriné Ekonomika 22, no. 
3 (2011): 309. 
2 Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, 
Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 
1–28. 
3 Donahue and Tuohy. 
4 For the purposes of this research, “near real-time” is defined as one to seven days after initiation of 
the event. As the learning is to be assessed by an external team, 24 hours represents a lower estimate of 
placing a multi-disciplinary team on site. Given that collection, analysis, and dissemination of incident data 
would still have to occur once at the incident scene, seven days is offered as the upper limit to still be 
timely and meaningful. The author acknowledges that many factors, such as distance to the incident and 
method of travel, number of complexity factors (multiple threat vectors, new tactics, severe lethality), and 
number of incident evaluators performing research, can influence these estimates, which would change the 
timeframe of one to seven days. 
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all constitute barriers to learning quickly. The current after-action report process 
underappreciates the learning processes needed to get the right information to the end-user. 
Fortunately, some learning organizations do exist and demonstrate recognizable 
characteristics that accelerate or contribute to enterprise-wide organizational learning.5 
First, such organizations embed a culture of learning into all processes, not just when an 
incident occurs or when something goes wrong.6 Second, learning organizations embrace 
failure as critical to innovation and learning, rather than avoiding, fearing, or denying it.7 
Third, specific persons, entities, or teams own the learning process for the organization, 
which develops an organizational learning specialization, not an ancillary duty.8 Homeland 
security possesses none of these features; therefore, a study of effective learning 
organizations may render a roadmap for efficient, timely, and more accurate learning for 
the homeland security enterprise (HSE).  
This thesis investigated, through comparative case study analysis, two 
organizations purpose-built for organizational and enterprise-wide learning. Those two 
organizations, the Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), have demonstrated a repeatable learning process 
suitable for the HSE. A third analysis compared the learning efforts of official after-action 
reports with a novel learning team deployed by the High Threat Institute (HTI) following 
the 1 October massacre in Las Vegas. Each case study evaluated timeliness of reporting, 
sensemaking of facts, and dissemination to a broader community. 
The United States Army formally created CALL in 1985 “as a unit for collecting 
new lessons as they emerged from army operations, either in a live situation . . . or during 
                                               
5 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, rev. ed. (New 
York: Doubleday/Currency, 2006). 
6 Steven Mains and Gil Ad Ariely, “Learning While Fighting,” Prism 2, no. 3 (June 2011): 166. 
7 Bill Roberts, “Innovation Quotient,” Electronic Business 26, no. 13 (December 2000): 98. 
8 Cynthia C. Lebow et al., Safety in the Skies: Personnel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident 
Investigations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR1122.html. 
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simulations.”9 CALL’s framework for learning translates multiple sources of data into 
timely, meaningful outputs for end-users and optimizes how practitioners receive those 
products. Notably, CALL also uses lessons learned to their fullest extent by then initiating 
doctrinal change with the new information. CALL’s process embeds a learning culture into 
its parent organization and maintains a robust system to learn from action. In the case study 
of troops deployed to Haiti, real-time learning captured from an embedded learning team 
influenced how follow-on troops conducted operations. This ability to quickly transmit 
knowledge in the field shows promise for the HSE using the CALL framework. 
The NTSB investigates significant accidents and incidents for the transportation 
community, employing a near real-time learning team to assess ground conditions and 
event information as soon as possible after an accident occurs. In 2019, the motor vessel 
Conception was involved in one of the deadliest maritime accidents in modern history.10 
This tragic incident served as an effective case study to demonstrate the attributes of a 
learning team: fast learning and knowledge transmission, both within and outside of the 
initial community of interest. Given the timeliness of the NTSB Go Team’s response, swift 
data collection under chaotic event circumstances, the ability to quickly collect and make 
sense of data from multiple systems, and an established and effective route of 
dissemination, the NTSB model could be applied to other high-impact and complex 
incidents that require near real-time information and analysis to improve industry practices 
or processes.  
The HTI is a non-profit grassroots effort founded in December 2016, “focused on 
developing an innovative framework for instituting a public safety–oriented platform of 
research, training, and education.”11 In 2017, the HTI assembled a team of researchers, 
including this author, to test a concept of operations for near real-time learning from a high-
                                               
9 Alton Y. K. Chua and Wing Lam, “Center for Army Lessons Learned: Knowledge Application 
Process in the Military,” International Journal of Knowledge Management 2, no. 2 (2006): 72, https://doi.
org/10.4018/jkm.2006040105. 
10 National Transportation Safety Board, “Preliminary Report Marine DCA19MM047” (Washington, 
DC: National Transportation Safety Board, September 12, 2019), https://ntsb.gov/investigations/Accident
Reports/Reports/DCA19MM047-preliminary-report.pdf. 
11 “Home Page,” High Threat Institute, last updated February 4, 2020, http://highthreatinstitute.org/. 
xx 
threat event, deploying October 2–5, 2017, to the 1 October incident in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
to collect interview accounts of responders. The data collected and the resulting findings 
demonstrate that the HTI information was equal or superior to official after-action reports, 
yet rendered in near real-time. 
Each case study demonstrates that quick, effective learning is possible even within 
large and complex agencies. What differentiates sub-optimal from meaningful learning is 
a systemic learning culture, and an emphasis on sensemaking and speed. This thesis 
examined effective organizational learning frameworks that can be applied to the HSE to 
accelerate knowledge acquisition from major events in near real-time. The results 
demonstrate that speed is not inhibitory to the learning process. Recommendations 
highlight the need for adaptive change in how the homeland security environment evolves, 
through the creation of an entity responsible for organizational learning. Such an approach 
would also leverage local learning officers to achieve bi-directionality in a novel 
knowledge acquisition process. Homeland security must embrace new approaches to rapid 
learning that account for near real-time data collection and sensemaking. Sensemaking will 
require incubators to embrace failure as a learning tool and to test concepts and novel 
approaches. The testing and testers will inherently act as the advocacy networks required 
for a new HSE systemic learning process. This concept promotes HSE organizational 
learning momentum, thus avoiding recurrent failures and enabling fast learning for 
optimized performance.  
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For every complex problem there is a simple solution that is wrong. 
 —George Bernard Shaw 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Organizational learning is necessary for any discipline to advance both its practices 
and professionals to meet current and future challenges. Homeland security is a relatively 
nascent field; therefore, it has appropriated learning theory and principles from other 
disciplines with more institutional history in organizational learning. Police, fire, 
emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency management generally conduct after-
action reports (AARs) following significant incidents to evaluate preparedness efforts, 
adequacies of response, and opportunities for improvement, yet lessons remain unlearned.1 
The after-action process has been loosely adopted from the military experience. Increasing 
first responder readiness for future events has been challenging, partly because no efficient 
or standardized way allows such responders to disseminate lessons learned from incidents 
of national significance.2 Nor has any entity articulated a process by which either individual 
or organizational learning might occur in near real-time.3 Thus, the homeland security 
enterprise is ill-equipped to learn from major events. 
By the time of an AAR, under current homeland security practices, at least a year 
has usually passed since the incident under review. Institutional or national memory of the 
incident has been diminished or lost, and practitioners have moved on to concentrate their 
                                               
1 Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, 
Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006). 
2 Donahue and Tuohy. 
3 For the purposes of this research, “near real-time” is defined as one to seven days after initiation of 
the event. As the learning is to be assessed by an external team, 24 hours represents a lower estimate of 
placing a multi-disciplinary team on site. Given that collection, analysis, and dissemination of incident data 
would still have to occur once at the incident scene, seven days is offered as the upper limit to still be 
timely and meaningful. The author acknowledges that many factors, such as distance to the incident and 
method of travel, number of complexity factors (multiple threat vectors, new tactics, severe lethality), and 
number of incident evaluators performing research, can influence these estimates, which would change the 
timeframe of one to seven days. 
2 
efforts on other agency priorities such as community policing efforts, risk reduction 
programs, or medical and fire responses.4 In other words, the daily activities of homeland 
security practitioners and response agencies trump the opportunity cost for true learning. 
Whether homeland security can learn from events evokes mixed responses. 
Homeland security has previously been assessed as stubborn about learning from past 
events.5 However, whether this deficiency stems from not collecting lessons, analyzing 
them incorrectly, or disseminating them too narrowly—or some combination thereof—
remains to be seen. Jeffrey Kaliner concurs: “The problem of how preparedness and 
response organizations effectively elicit, develop, capture, and disseminate organizational 
knowledge has been difficult to answer.”6 Given the current body of knowledge, the field 
can improve its learning process. 
Unfortunately, the field learns at an excruciatingly slow pace and in a way that may 
not be optimal, especially during violent events. Confounding the problem, after-action 
reviews originated in the military, yet homeland security uses them extensively in a 
different fashion, and all the other tools supporting the AAR process, such as a learning 
culture, learning teams, or acceptance of failure, have not been inculcated into homeland 
security.7 In one example, the Army has an entire entity dedicated to learning from events, 
a framework to process that information, and a learning culture to support the 
implementation of after-action reviews.8 Yet no evidence suggests such support in 
                                               
4 Unpublished data by this researcher—analyzing the average time for 17 high-threat events over the 
past 21 years—demonstrated that the average time for an after-action review to be completed is 1.42 years 
with a minimum of 0.42 years (Aurora, Illinois, active shooter, 2019), and maximum of 2.55 years 
(Virginia Tech active shooter, 2007), with a median of 1.63 years respectively. 
5 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn.” 
6 Jeffrey Kaliner, “When Will We Ever Learn? The After Action Review, Lessons Learned and the 
Next Steps in Training and Educating the Homeland Security Enterprise for the 21st Century” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), v, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34683. 
7 Marilyn J. Darling and Charles S. Parry, “After-Action Reviews: Linking Reflection and Planning in 
a Learning Practice,” Reflections 3, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 64–72. 
8 David A. Garvin, “The U.S. Army’s After Action Reviews: Seizing the Chance to Learn,” in 
Learning in Action, a Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2000), 9, https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/files/wfldp/docs/army-seizing-chance-to-
learn.pdf. 
3 
homeland security, nor has enterprise-wide organizational learning occurred systemically.9 
This gap and lack of timeliness have stifled learning from major events, innovation, and 
advancement of the homeland security enterprise (HSE). 
Violent, high-threat events, such as active-shooter/active-violence incidents, fire as 
a weapon, and responses to explosives, warrant immediate national-level learning for these 
complicated and complex threats given the multi-disciplinary coordination needed for 
mitigation. Threat actors iterate tactics and aggressors copycat incidents. Also, tens of 
thousands of departments and agencies possess the need to learn. The sheer size, diversity 
of the homeland security enterprise, and the collective action problem of who should 
champion knowledge capture all constitute barriers to learning quickly. The current AAR 
process underappreciates the learning processes needed to get the right information to the 
end-user. 
However, learning organizations do exist and demonstrate recognizable 
characteristics that accelerate or contribute to enterprise-wide organizational learning.10 
First, such organizations embed a culture of learning into all processes, not just when an 
incident occurs or when something goes wrong.11 Second, learning organizations embrace 
failure as critical to innovation and learning, rather than avoiding it.12 Third, specific 
persons, entities, or teams own the learning process for the organization, which develops 
an organizational learning specialization, not an ancillary duty.13 Homeland security 
displays none of these features; therefore, a study of effective learning organizations may 
render a roadmap for efficient, timely, and more accurate learning for the HSE.  
While many commercial organizations, especially in technology, exhibit a learning 
culture, to draw conclusions about paramilitary agencies—such as police, fire, or EMS—
                                               
9 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn.” 
10 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, rev. ed. (New 
York: Doubleday/Currency, 2006). 
11 Steven Mains and Gil Ad Ariely, “Learning While Fighting,” Prism 2, no. 3 (June 2011): 166. 
12 Bill Roberts, “Innovation Quotient,” Electronic Business 26, no. 13 (December 2000): 98. 
13 Cynthia C. Lebow et al., Safety in the Skies: Personnel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident 
Investigations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR1122.html. 
4 
this thesis has employed two entities that exhibit a demonstrable learning culture, practice, 
and organization: the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Both the NTSB and CALL are widely recognized in the 
literature as entities that contribute significantly to the fields of knowledge management 
and organizational learning through their respective systems and methods.14 The NTSB 
investigates significant transportation incidents by applying a fixed learning process after 
the accident. This process requires in-field inquiry, analysis, and dissemination of findings. 
Although the NTSB is legislatively mandated, it retains independence for accident 
investigation. This autonomy limits influence and bias in the learning process. Its findings, 
while critical to future safety efforts, are not mandatory but implemented at the discretion 
of the industry.  
Operating as a tool of the Department of the Army, CALL has a long history of 
capturing on-the-ground learning, which has translated into doctrinal change in some 
instances and incremental innovation in others. CALL manages learning for the agency 
and has advanced the after-action review for both training and operations since its 
inception. With a clearly defined learning process that assigns roles and responsibilities for 
capturing learning, CALL has a specific mechanism for making sense of the information 
received and multiple systems to optimize dissemination of new knowledge. Importantly, 
the institution of the U.S. Army expects organizational learning, so the agency does not 
repeat mistakes or cost additional soldiers’ lives because of ineffective tactics. 
In a small-scale attempt to challenge the AAR timeline, process, and output, a small 
team from the High Threat Institute (HTI) deployed immediately after the 1 October 
massacre in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 2017.15 Although not meant to replace the official AAR 
                                               
14 Mains and Ariely, “Learning While Fighting”; Alton Y. K. Chua and Wing Lam, “Center for Army 
Lessons Learned: Knowledge Application Process in the Military,” International Journal of Knowledge 
Management 2, no. 2 (2006), https://doi.org/10.4018/jkm.2006040105.; Lebow et al., Safety in the Skies. 
15 See www.highthreatinsitute.org. The High Threat Institute (HTI) is an established 501(c)3 non-profit 
comprising subject-matter experts across multiple disciplines who analyze the high-threat space. In 2017, 
researchers, including this author, launched the HTI “Fly Team” and were on the ground within 23 hours 
after the start of the 1 October massacre to collect incident response data. Over the course of three days, the 
HTI interviewed key personnel and then disseminated the findings to the High Threat Institute for 
situational awareness and analysis to test the real-time learning concept. 
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process, situational awareness and some sensemaking of a very complex high-threat 
incident occurred in a compressed time frame, and participants transmitted specific 
response information to other offsite subject-matter experts (SMEs). A closer analysis of 
these two learning organizations, combined with a comparative analysis of the near real-
time learning from 1 October vis-à-vis the official AAR, may produce a framework that 
optimizes learning from significant events for homeland security.16 
In sum, no agency, locality, community, or jurisdiction should have to experience 
an incident directly to learn; the costs are too high. Alternatives to direct learning—
conducting formal after-actions, listening to first-hand accounts, or forming a team to 
research the incident at some distant point in the future—are slow.17 Organizational 
learning for emergency response entities and the connection to high-threat incidents are an 
underdeveloped research field. This thesis aspires to help fill this research gap. 
Specifically, it seeks to investigate how the HSE of police, fire, EMS, and emergency 
management can learn from these events in a quicker, more meaningful fashion than 
current practices allow. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the homeland security enterprise learn faster from high-threat events? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis sought to evaluate how the HSE could learn faster institutionally in the 
context of high-threat events. Toward that end, I employed a comparative analysis as the 
research method to evaluate the similarities and differences in organizational learning 
methods of two organizations—the NTSB and CALL—with significant responsibilities 
and institutional knowledge in organizational learning, and analyzed their processes 
                                               
16 Mains and Ariely, “Learning While Fighting,” 166. 
17 For an example of a learning tool prepared by a deployed research team eight months after an 
incident, see QuinnWilliams, LLC, The Attacks on Paris: Lessons Learned (Los Angeles: Homeland 
Security Advisory Council, 2016), https://www.hsacouncil.org/s/HSAC-Paris_LessonsLearned_
WhitePaper.pdf. 
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against those with which homeland security currently captures incident knowledge. 
Generally, these processes involve after-action reports.  
Researching and publishing an official AAR inevitably involves delay.18 Using the 
case studies, I identified and studied organizations that have excelled at learning quickly 
from significant events. Therefore, within the context of this research, comparing the 
analysis of an official AAR with what could be captured in near real-time seems fruitful. 
Given the results of a previous experiment of near real-time learning for the 1 October 
massacre, the information gleaned from that method of collection and analysis was 
compared to the official Las Vegas, Nevada, AAR. In doing so, this thesis could investigate 
this approach and draw generalizations about the feasibility of near real-time learning for 
future homeland security operations.  
The thesis used the critical incident technique—an approach “to understand the key 
things people in a certain profession or activity should do or not do in order for them to 
have the best chance of achieving their goals.”19 This approach within the case studies 
allowed me to source critical factors related to successful organizational learning across 
the government and the military.20 I selected the multiple case study method to evaluate 
differing organizational, political, and motivational structures to extrapolate to the multi-
disciplinary homeland security high-threat environment in the future. In addition, I 
consulted secondary sources to evaluate the methods by which each organization learns.  
1. Case Selection 
Whether legislatively mandated (NTSB) or doctrinally instilled (CALL), these 
organizations embody a learning ethic. Furthermore, they learn from specified events and 
share that knowledge, both within their organizations and in some cases with external 
                                               
18 Unpublished data by this researcher—analyzing the average time for 17 high-threat events over the 
past 21 years—demonstrated that the average time for an after-action review to be completed is 1.42 years 
with a minimum of 0.42 years (Aurora, Illinois, active shooter, 2019), and maximum of 2.55 years 
(Virginia Tech active shooter, 2007), with a median of 1.63 years respectively. 
19 Roderik F. Viergever, “The Critical Incident Technique: Method or Methodology?,” Qualitative 
Health Research 29, no. 7 (June 2019): 1066, https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732318813112. 
20 Viergever. 
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partners. No one has investigated these learning organizations to connect their learning 
principles specifically to the HSE. 
The NTSB, a federal agency, investigates transportation accidents resulting in 
significant injury, loss of life, or systemic threats to the transportation system. The NTSB 
assesses the safety of the transportation system under the federal budget. Numerous recent 
examples—from the Boeing 737 Max 800 recall to the Conception boat fire, which resulted 
in 34 fatalities off the coast of Santa Barbara in September 2019—demonstrate the 
investigatory and learning capabilities of the NTSB and justify its inclusion in the dataset.21 
In each case, investigations occurred swiftly, and change was mandated because of 
institutional learning from key findings and timely recommendations.  
CALL originated the modern-day lessons-learned process:  
[It] is the Army’s daily focal point for adaptive learning based on lessons 
and best practices from the total force and provides timely and relevant 
knowledge to the warfighter and . . . unified action partners utilizing 
integrated systems and interactive technology in order to simplify winning 
in a complex world.22  
CALL coordinates lessons learned for the entire Army and functions as a knowledge 
management hub. Not only does CALL structure organizational learning appropriately for 
the Army, but it also translates learning into practice by suggesting training or doctrinal 
revisions based on findings. CALL optimizes both learning and innovation by displaying 
unique organizational learning concepts, such as advocacy networks and incubators, where 
ideas can be cultivated in a safe atmosphere for trial-and-error learning.23 CALL links 
innovation and learning in a manner that should be evaluated for applicability in homeland 
security.  
                                               
21 “NTSB Issues 7 Safety Recommendations to FAA Related to Ongoing Lion Air, Ethiopian Airlines 
Crash Investigations,” National Transportation Safety Board, September 26, 2019, https://www.ntsb.
gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20190926.aspx; National Transportation Safety Board, “Preliminary 
Report Marine DCA19MM047” (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, September 12, 
2019), https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/DCA19MM047-preliminary-report.pdf. 
22 “Center for Army Lessons Learned,” U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, October 2, 2018, 
https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call. 
23 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2016), 142–54. 
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In sum, these two cases provide significant insight into learning from crises, direct 
action, and emergencies that happen in the HSE. The extent to which new tools can be 
applied for better organizational learning is long past due. 
2. Data Collection 
The instrumentation for this study included academic research of open-source 
materials. Written sources from each organization were analyzed for organizational 
learning best practices. Each chapter and case study begins with an overview of the 
organization and its stated organizational learning objectives. It then covers the organizing 
principles that facilitate the collection of data in a timely fashion, analysis of data, and 
dissemination of data to the respective community of interest. The research design has 
adopted Kathleen Eisenhardt’s case study methodology to most efficiently support policy 
development from the findings.24  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review investigates the various bodies of knowledge needed to 
successfully explore quicker learning for homeland security. This content, however, does 
not reside across any one domain of theory. Accordingly, this review encompasses multiple 
fields including traditional organizational learning, knowledge management, and 
operations research. An overarching theme of this exploration and a central tenet of this 
thesis are the comparisons between these domains at rest (non-emergent daily conditions) 
and—perhaps more importantly for homeland security—how the domains apply when 
crisis, emergency, or disasters occur. 
1. Organizational Learning 
Scholars argue that many disciplines within homeland security learn both inside 
and outside the classroom through traditional academic practices and on-the-job training 
or apprenticeship. Gary A. Klein, for example, notes that firefighters use past performance 
                                               
24 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 4 (October 1989): 532–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/258557. 
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to make decisions rapidly in future situations.25 Indeed, according to Getty and colleagues, 
police officers often start their careers in a probationary status in which they have to 
tangibly demonstrate concepts, skills, and practices learned before becoming full members 
of the organization.26 Similarly, Alan Cox describes the significant cultural connection 
firefighters develop from probationary status onward throughout a career, which is a form 
of organizational learning.27 Nevertheless, as Deverell argues, how an organization learns 
is still not well understood, and making matters worse for homeland security, learning from 
crisis is even murkier.28 A critical gap noted and specific to the needs of this thesis is not 
only learning from crisis but potentially learning during crisis.  
In this context, a corpus of literature discusses organizational learning, which is 
defined by Schwab as the process “when experience systematically alters behavior or 
knowledge.”29 This definition helps to frame the ideal end state for responders evolving 
from previous incidents. The homeland security community uses the term “lessons 
learned” to describe all things learning. Given the requirement of Schwab’s definition to 
have a real organizational change in behavior for learning to occur, additional research on 
the number of “lessons” incorporated into practice may be needed.  
Schwab’s definition comports with Deverell’s assertion of two types of learning 
processes: lessons distilled and lessons implemented. Lessons distilled are “lessons 
observed that do not change actual behaviour.”30 Lessons implemented are those put into 
                                               
25 Gary A Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 
17. 
26 Ryan M. Getty, John L. Worrall, and Robert G. Morris, “How Far from the Tree Does the Apple 
Fall? Field Training Officers, Their Trainees, and Allegations of Misconduct,” Crime & Delinquency 62, 
no. 6 (June 2016): 822, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128714545829. 
27 Alan Thomas Cox, “The Significance of Fire Service Culture as an Impediment to Effective 
Leadership in the Homeland Security Environment” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 
49, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/6781. 
28 Edward Deverell, “Crises as Learning Triggers: Exploring a Conceptual Framework of Crisis‐
Induced Learning,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 17, no. 3 (September 2009): 179, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2009.00578.x. 
29 Andreas Schwab, “Incremental Organizational Learning from Multilevel Information Sources: 
Evidence for Cross-Level Interactions,” Organization Science 18, no. 2 (April 2007): 233, https://doi.org/
10.1287/orsc.1060.0238. 
30 Deverell, “Crises as Learning Triggers,” 180. 
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place “that change individual and organizational behaviour.”31 The imperative of actual 
organizational change aligns with the findings of Donahue and Tuohy—that many lessons 
articulated in after-action reports are just observed, not learned, thus contributing very little 
to organizational learning.32 Most official learning after a significant event is not time 
sensitive.33 But for this thesis, speed is important. Baird, Holland, and Deacon discuss the 
importance of “learning from action” and the close coupling of learning and performance.34 
As Baird and colleagues state, “If we shift our perspective from ‘getting more performance 
into the learning process’ to ‘getting more learning into the performance process,’ a whole 
new set of approaches can be added to our arsenal. We move from action learning to 
learning from action.”35 Critically, however, they also broach the requirement for speed: it 
“is often not fast enough or grounded enough in performance to keep up with the pace of 
change.”36 Although not evaluated by Baird, Holland, and Deacon, the change discussed 
could be envisioned as new threat actors or threat tactics confront the homeland security 
response community. 
In contrast, the literature classifies learning organizations as those that learn at a 
quick pace or use a framework to learn consistently. This definition is distinct from 
organizational learning. Classical learning theory suggests two types of learning systems. 
Indeed, Argyris and Schön describe both single and double-loop learning systems as two 
                                               
31 Deverell, 180. 
32 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn.” 
33 Unpublished data by this researcher—analyzing the average time for 17 high-threat events over the 
past 21 years—demonstrated that the average time for an after-action review to be completed is 1.42 years 
with a minimum of 0.42 years (Aurora, Illinois, active shooter, 2019), and maximum of 2.55 years 
(Virginia Tech active shooter, 2007), with a median of 1.63 years respectively. 
34 Lloyd Baird, Phil Holland, and Sandra Deacon, “Learning from Action: Imbedding More Learning 
into the Performance Fast Enough to Make a Difference,” Organizational Dynamics 27, no. 4 (1999): 19–
32, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0090-2616(99)90027-X. 
35 Baird, Holland, and Deacon, 19. The authors specifically transpose word order here to mean two 
different concepts. Action learning is about driving more production into the learning process whereas 
learning from action is about learning while production or action is occurring. The authors contend that 
action learning as a process is not fast enough to keep pace with performance. Learning from action is 
almost simultaneous and iterative whereas, by performing the action, learning is captured and used to 
continuously improve. 
36 Baird, Holland, and Deacon, 19. 
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distinctive mechanisms of learning.37 They define single-loop systems as those that 
recognize an error, such as in a procedure or task, and then work to fix the defect. Double-
loop learning systems assess and correct the same parameters of single-loop learning but 
have the end-learner question or assess the underlying assumptions of the process to 
determine whether optimization or change needs to occur. 38 Deverell sees the utility of 
double-loop learning for crisis learning but argues that “single-loop learning processes are 
equally important teachers of how learning processes come about.”39 Although certainly 
true for traditional events, high-threat events need to be viewed from the lens of double-
loop learning, both during and after a crisis, and prioritizing single-loop learning is a 
criticism of Deverell’s argument.40 Future research into reframing learning, especially 
through the after-action report, should be considered with double-loop learning outcomes 
in mind. 
Questioning the underlying assumptions of the incident lies at the heart of double-
loop learning. Finkel stresses that learning may need to be inculcated in a culture for 
meaningful knowledge capture to occur, which has implications for high-threat response 
and which has not generally been evaluated in the current literature.41 Innovation in 
doctrine must assess the underlying assumptions about the response to the attacking force. 
Finkel points out that the Israelis used double-loop learning during the Yom Kippur War 
and demonstrates the lack of double-loop learning by British and American air forces 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor.42 Since those fateful times, Finkel describes, 
                                               
37 Chris Argyris and Donald Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Boston: 
Addison-Wesley, 1978). 
38 Argyris and Schön. 
39 Deverell, “Crises as Learning Triggers,” 184. 
40 The term “high threat” was first introduced by Marino et al. in 2015 and included both an active 
shooter and fire as a weapon. Broadly, through current capability development in the National Capital 
Region, high threat has expanded to include those initial response types as well as other atypical events 
involving complex coordinated attacks, civil disturbance, active violence (knife, vehicle ramming, or 
CRBN), explosive events, intelligence optimization, and technological threats such as unmanned aerial 
systems. Michael Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property: High Threat Response,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 11, no. 5 (January 2015): 1–18. 
41 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield 
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011), 112, ProQuest. 
42 Finkel, 115–16. 
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American and Israeli armies have developed mechanisms of quickly 
disseminating information. . . . Learning officers and learning teams are 
dispatched to collect data, which is then analyzed to gain practical insights 
for changes in the Army. The lessons derived from the operations are either 
remitted directly to the forces or integrated into the training programs, 
doctrine, and weapons system development.43  
Similarly, Naot, Lipshitz, and Popper investigated the richness of organizational 
learning and assessed double-loop learning as a critical factor in learning from past 
experience:  
The bottom-line criterion of successful assimilation was achieved through 
assimilation-enhancing activities, systematic dissemination, double-loop 
learning that enlisted both internal and external resources of knowledge 
available to the unit, and a policy of widespread participation and 
empowerment that won the hearts, as well as minds, of the unit’s 
members.44  
If double-loop learning is linked to learning richness, as connected above to learning, 
current learning practices of the homeland security community should also be evaluated 
for this concept.45 Basten and Haamann do not take sides on the theoretical debate about 
single- versus double-loop learning utility but do show a gap such that, structurally, “an 
ideal learning organization has not been realized yet, which can be attributed to the lack of 
concrete prescriptions [of] how to implement the competencies suggested in the 
literature.”46 Importantly, the HSE literature has no comparable coverage.  
However, the literature proposes an ideal of the “learning organization,” which 
strives to obtain knowledge translation fully across the enterprise in a timely process. Senge 
relates organizational learning as a direct result of individual leaning and describes 
                                               
43 Finkel, 118. 
44 Yael Ben-Horin Naot, Raanan Lipshitz, and Micha Popper, “Discerning the Quality of 
Organizational Learning,” Management Learning 35, no. 4 (December 2004): 468, https://doi.org/10.
1177/1350507604048273. 
45 Information richness is defined as “the ability of an information exchange to change participant’s 
understanding within a time interval.” See Richard L. Daft, “Information Richness Theory,” in 
Encyclopedia of Management Theory, vol. 1, ed. E. Kessler (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 
2020), 370-372, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452276090. 
46 Dirk Basten and Thilo Haamann, “Approaches for Organizational Learning: A Literature Review,” 
SAGE Open 8, no. 3 (April 2018): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018794224. 
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individual competency, “mental models,” collective knowledge, and goal attainment as 
critical to the realization of organizational learning.47 Thus, Senge’s entire “fifth 
discipline” relates to systems thinking, and fundamentally, this approach “makes 
understandable the subtlest aspect of the learning organization—the new way individuals 
perceive themselves and their world. At the heart of a learning organization is a shift of 
mind—from seeing ourselves as separate from the world to connected to the world.”48 For 
enterprise-wide organizational learning to occur, systems thinking is a logical framework 
to consider, especially for analyzing the effectiveness of responder performance at high-
threat events. 
Although not specifically articulated by Senge, this connection between knowledge 
and the individual is what Snowden and others have described as sensemaking.49 The 
extent to which sensemaking applies to the crisis learning process needs to be evaluated. 
Generally, Senge represents the importance of a culture of learning within; however, a 
formal culture of learning is not evident for homeland security outside the ubiquitous AAR 
whereas the military culture of learning has been investigated extensively in the literature.50 
As such, scholars of the profession may continue to evaluate proven practices of learning 
and apply them to the high-threat environment. 
Weick dominates the organizational learning literature, especially in high-
performance organizational learning, such as the aircraft carrier community, which might 
be analogous to the HSE given time pressures, extremely stressful events over short 
periods, the chain-of-command structure, and zero tolerance for failure or loss of life. 
Along with Sutcliffe, Weick suggests five characteristics needed for organization 
performance under stressful circumstances: a flattened organizational structure not relying 
                                               
47 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 129–252. 
48 Senge, 12. 
49 For additional source information, see David J. Snowden, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision 
Making: Wise Executives Tailor Their Approach to Fit the Complexity of the Circumstances They Face,” 
Harvard Business Review 85, no. 11 (November 2007): 68–76; Kaliner, “When Will We Ever Learn?”; 
Graham Dwyer and Cynthia Hardy, “Organizing to Save Lives: Post-Inquiry Sensemaking & Learning in 
Bushfire Emergency Organizations,” Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, no. 1 (August 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.10085abstract. 
50 Senge, The Fifth Discipline. 
14 
on a chain of command for SMEs, embodying an ethos that supports flexibility, inculcating 
learning culture principles, embracing complexity, and showing a willingness to admit 
mistakes with subsequent support for learning from them across the organization.51 
Themes of decentralization of command also emerge.52 Understanding how the HSE can 
effectively borrow established organizational learning principles is imperative. 
To that end, Jensen relates the propriety of concepts originally articulated by Finkel 
on doctrinal innovation but goes a step further for the modern U.S. Army. In his book 
entitled Forging the Sword, he introduces the concepts of both incubators and advocacy 
networks that play critical roles in innovation of tactics and learning, which he ultimately 
ties to doctrinal changes. Moynihan and Landuyt suggest that “learning forums that 
establish collegiality and an equal footing for members are likely to overcome 
defensiveness and foster information sharing.”53 They also suggest that organizations 
allocate the bandwidth for learning or, as they deem it, the “organizational slack” to 
acculturate a learning process.54 Given the spectrum of organizational learning, forums 
within an organization can be created to manage learning internally, but external forces 
may need to provide resources to enhance or support overall learning processes for 
enterprise innovation. 
Along the same lines, as national security advisor H. R. McMaster stated, “The U.S. 
Army defines innovation as ‘the result of critical and creative thinking and the conversion 
of new ideas into valued outcomes,’” which represent the measures by which learning is 
evaluated for homeland security in this thesis.55 In relating the criticality of their role in 
                                               
51 Karl E. Weick, Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), 3–17. 
52 While the Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is an established military learning organization 
with a hierarchical structure, it does not necessarily equate rank with experience required to capture 
learning. Outside of the established learning objectives, on-the-ground teams use this experience to explore 
topics that may be important for organizational learning. 
53 Donald P. Moynihan and Noel Landuyt, “How Do Public Organizations Learn? Bridging Cultural 
and Structural Perspectives,” Public Administration Review 69, no. 6 (November 2009): 1100, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02067.x. 
54 Moynihan and Landuyt, 1099. 
55 Jensen, Forging the Sword, viii. 
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doctrinal change, Jensen defines incubators as “informal subunits established outside the 
hierarchy” and advocacy networks as those “championing new concepts that emerge from 
incubators.”56 Potentially, a new entity responsible for organizational learning may be 
needed for the HSE that can act more quickly than currently demonstrated. 
Importantly, no data or literature ties these two concepts formally to homeland 
security. Incubators certainly provide “safe space” to think and test, which has been 
articulated as necessary for business.57 Weick similarly uses the wildland firefighting 
analogy of “dropping tools” to describe the sensemaking and innovation needed to survive 
a complex event and extrapolate lessons to the larger study of organizational learning.58 
The dropping of tools refers to a wildfire event in which some firefighters innovate on the 
spot by creating new tactics while others do not and perish. Even if organizational learning 
occurs, potentially with innovation of tactics within an incident, the overall cultivation of 
that new knowledge in the community of interest must also occur.59 This approach means 
that knowledge must be extrapolated and transmitted for holistic value to the community. 
Ideally, providing safe space, in similar contexts for multiple organizations, could be used 
as a template for learning across a diverse subset of emergency response organizations. 
2. Knowledge Management 
Even if sense can be made in a timely fashion from high-threat events, which has 
not been shown, knowledge would need to be effectively transmitted and stored for the 
HSE. High-threat events have different learning needs from those of traditional events: 
high-threat events are complex, multi-disciplinary, and man-made, necessitating 
                                               
56 Jensen, 142. 
57 See Richard Karlgaard, The Soft Edge: Where Great Companies Find Lasting Success (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2014), 59; Peter Merrill, “Benchmarking Innovation,” Quality Progress 49, no. 9 
(September 2016): 43, 45; Rick Lash, “Best Practices for Leading via Innovation,” Harvard Business 
Review, August 6, 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/08/best-practices-for-leading-via. 
58 Karl E. Weick, “Drop Your Tools: An Allegory for Organizational Studies,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1996): 301–13. 
59 Mark Easterby-Smith, Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, 2nd ed. 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 404–26. 
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learning—and quickly evolving tactics—before the next incident occurs.60 Also, high-
threat events require the integration of multiple disciplines for incident resolution, which 
increases complexity and may decrease operational efficiency.61 Hence, learning in this 
sense becomes more important because tactics must evolve and be shared. Richardson and 
Miller demonstrate that intelligence and information sharing in emergency services are 
suboptimal, which exposes another underlying problem: the information from learning in 
previous incidents, even if optimized, cannot be distributed quickly enough.62 The need for 
timely sharing of intelligence logically applies to time-critical sharing of incident response 
information, which involves the knowledge management process. 
Although knowledge management represents its own domain in the business 
literature, translating it for the HSE has not been fully explored. The flow and transmission 
of knowledge, otherwise referred to as “knowledge stock,” has been reviewed in depth by 
Nissen.63 His use case may be applied to the paramilitary HSE, as the original study 
reviewed knowledge management systems of a military joint task force. As Nissen 
postulates, designing systems to manage knowledge flows requires new thinking for 
optimal efforts—an idea that seems applicable to rapid learning among first responders.64 
Tzabbar et al. agree and identify three critical components of knowledge stocks: the 
intelligence possessed by the entity, the employees of the entity, and the interactions 
between the two that drive innovation or new knowledge creation.65 Although knowledge 
                                               
60 One high-threat event type is the active shooter example. A simple evolution of tactics can be seen 
from Columbine, to Virginia Tech, to the Aurora, Colorado, movie theater: Columbine used incendiary and 
explosive devices in the attack; police entry at Virginia Tech was denied using chains and locks around 
door handles; and the Aurora murderer delayed the police response using CS gas. 
61 Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property.” 
62 Thomas J. Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First 
Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5137; Patrick E. Miller, “How Can We Improve Information Sharing among 
Local Law Enforcement Agencies?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 85. 
63 Mark E. Nissen, “Dynamic Knowledge Patterns to Inform Design: A Field Study of Knowledge 
Stocks and Flows in an Extreme Organization,” Journal of Management Information Systems 22, no. 3 
(December 2005): 225–63, https://doi.org/10.2753/MIS0742-1222220308. 
64 Nissen, 226. 
65 Daniel Tzabbar et al., “When Is the Whole Bigger Than the Sum of Its Parts? Bundling Knowledge 
Stocks for Innovative Success,” Strategic Organization 6, no. 4 (2008): 381–82, https://doi.org/10.1177/
1476127008096363. 
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stocks and flows have been established in the literature as imperative for organizational 
learning, the interaction and implementation of each have not been established for 
homeland security.66 Several authors suggest a bottom-up approach to knowledge flow as 
optimal for military learning that may challenge current practices of high-threat learning. 
Furthermore, the after-action report is largely a top-down tool. Studies in knowledge 
management may represent an opportunity for additional bottom-up tools to be introduced 
to facilitate the learning process. 
One of the most important themes in knowledge management—and critical to any 
debate involving quicker learning—is the differentiation of types of knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge, as explored in Polanyi, Nonaka, and Takeuchi’s work, hypothesizes that the 
conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge may relate to the current AAR process 
as does the organization’s need to convert information into action.67 In Nonaka’s view, 
experiences build tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge, deemed the lesser of the two, 
is much simpler, easier to articulate, and easier to transmit.68 Brown and Duguid, who agree 
with Nonaka, simplify this comparison to “know-what” (explicit) and “know-how” (tacit) 
knowledge.69 A summary of tacit versus explicit knowledge is shown in Table 1. 
                                               
66 James G. March, “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science 
2, no. 1 (February 1991): 71–87, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.71; W. H. Starbuck, “Learning by 
Knowledge‐Intensive Firms,” Journal of Management Studies 29, no. 7 (1992): 713–740. 
67 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), https://books.google.com/books?id=qB7KuwAACAAJ; Ikujirō Nonaka, The 
Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). 
68 Nonaka, The Knowledge-Creating Company. 
69 John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, “Organizing Knowledge,” California Management Review 40, 
no. 3 (Spring 1998): 90–111, https://doi.org/10.2307/41165945. 
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Table 1. Tacit versus Explicit Knowledge70 
 
 
The references in this section, when lumped together, represent a target for future 
study in homeland security, whereby tacit and explicit knowledge both become optimized 
after a significant event to improve organizational learning. Figure 2 visualizes the amount 
of tacit knowledge to potentially unpack compared to the more overt knowledge generated 
in high-threat incidents. 
                                               
70 Source: Anthony Olomolaiye and Charles Egbu, “Tacit vs. Explicit Knowledge—The Current 
Approaches to Knowledge Management,” in Proceedings of the Second Scottish Conference for 
Postgraduate Researchers of the Built and Natural Environment (Glasgow, Glasgow Caledonian 
University, 2005), 771. ICT refers to information and communication technology. 
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Figure 1. Visualization of Tacit versus Explicit Knowledge71 
This knowledge conversation can potentially be problematic. In this connection, 
Pfeffer and Sutton show the problem of knowledge conversion of individuals and 
organizations in a knowing–doing gap, “which when combined with . . . flows and 
transmission work represent an opportunity for the homeland security enterprise to pinpoint 
exactly how optimal learning processes can close the gap that turns past performance or 
near real-time learning into future practice.”72 Importantly, however, Nissen teases out 
threads for the HSE, specifically in high-threat response: 
Knowledge needs to be applied—not just created or possessed—in order for 
a firm to extract value and to offset opportunity costs. . . . Communities of 
practice involve both stocks and flows of knowledge. Members of such 
communities are generally not part of a single organization yet they 
coordinate through common practices . . . to determine the knowledge 
stocks that are relevant to such practices.73 
                                               
71 Source: “About KM,” United States Agency for International Development, accessed July 1, 2020, 
https://toolkits.knowledgesuccess.org/toolkits/km/about-km. 
72 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, “Knowing,” California Management Review 42, no. 1 (Fall 
1999): 83–108. 
73 Nissen, “Dynamic Knowledge Patterns to Inform Design,” 231. 
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Although the literature identifies no single entity to manage knowledge flows and 
stocks comprehensively for high-threat response, practitioners could benefit from this 
leadership toward better learning. Value to the firm, in the case of the HSE writ large, could 
mean better response practices, more efficient procedures, or better-suited equipment—all 
realized through quicker learning—while opportunity costs might be responder or civilian 
lives spared or time and money saved.  
In an example of detrimental opportunity costs to the enterprise, Nissen et al. use a 
friendly fire example from the Gulf War to contextualize knowledge flow. As Nissen et al. 
relate, “Enterprises do not all operate in the same environment, and effective organization 
and process design must explicitly take into account the context of knowledge flows.”74 
When framed within the context of multi-disciplinary homeland security response, the 
same pressures of different operating environments, rules of engagement, and response 
priorities remain. Furthermore, the model of knowledge flow applied could be 
extrapolated—as the flows for the incident “are embedded within a hazardous, time-critical 
context with mortal consequences”—even to homeland security.75 Nissen et al. draw 
attention to two potential knowledge flow models—the life cycle model, or “capture, 
organize, formalize, distribute, apply”; and the spiral model, which depends on 
“socialization, externalization, combination and integration”—both of which could help 
optimize knowledge flows in nationally significant incidents for homeland security.76 
Ultimately, the works of Nissen, Pfeffer, Sutton, and Nonaka suggest theoretical models 
by which organizations can maximize knowledge management across their enterprises. 
How these models can be practically applied in homeland security to create more efficient, 
or at the least more effective, learning remains to be clarified. 
                                               
74 Mark E. Nissen et al., “Contextual Criticality of Knowledge-Flow Dynamics: Understanding a US 
Tragedy of Friendly Fire,” Defense & Security Analysis 20, no. 3 (September 2004): 210, https://doi.org/
10.1080/1475179042000260651. 
75 Nissen et al., 210. 
76 Nissen et al. 
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3. Operational Performance Research 
Much of the learning literature reviews military performance and operational 
battlefield reports. End-users read these articles in the form of an after-action report, and 
such a report appears relatively quickly after the initiating event.77 The literature parses 
military learning into two buckets: interwar and intrawar learning.78 Moynihan adapts these 
concepts into intercrisis and intracrisis, which may have more applicability for the HSE.79 
He largely focuses on intracrisis learning, given the paucity of research in this area, but 
fails to envision a type of learning that blends the types to enhance learning significantly 
during an event. His analysis uses a case study of an outbreak that spanned a year, so the 
concepts might apply differently in a homeland security event with a shorter timeframe, 
such as a terrorist or active-shooter event. Notably, he highlights three barriers to intracrisis 
learning: “(a) a mismatch between information and task, (b) cognitive limitations, and (c) 
political barriers to learning.”80 The extent to which each of these barriers apply to near 
real-time learning is unclear. 
No literature espouses a complete framework that a homeland security practitioner 
could apply across the enterprise in a standardized learning format, which represents a 
significant gap and opportunity for future research. Although Kaliner comes close by 
suggesting multiple “emergency learning frameworks” that deal with both exercise and 
incident learning, he fails to explain how any framework would be meaningfully 
operationalized.81 He does broach the idea of real-time learning that has significance for 
high-threat response.82 Many scholars have posited, however, the idea that no crisis should 
                                               
77 Baird, Holland, and Deacon, “Learning from Action.” 
78 Lonnie B. Adams III, The Interwar Period: Lessons from the Past (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army 
War College, 1992), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA251293; Dmitry Adamsky, “From Israel with 
Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Intra-War Coercion and Brute Force,” Security Studies 26, no. 1 (2017): 
157–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243923. 
79 Donald P. Moynihan, “From Intercrisis to Intracrisis Learning,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management 17, no. 3 (September 2009): 189–98, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2009.00579.x. 
80 Moynihan, 191. 
81 Kaliner, “When Will We Ever Learn?,” 35–63. 
82 Kaliner, 66. 
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go to waste.83 For example, Thomas Birkland has demonstrated this opportunity in both 
manmade phenomena, such as the September 11 terrorist events, and natural disasters, such 
as earthquakes and hurricanes.84 Others, like Dominic Elliott, have deemed such 
opportunities “focusing event[s].”85 Previously, an official source completed “lessons 
learned” as well as collated and housed them in a central repository. The Department of 
Homeland Security defunded the Lessons Learned Information Sharing database, 
maintained by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in 2015. The Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security in Monterey, California, currently houses these 
reports.86 Given the diversity of the homeland security space and the number of actors 
within it, no one agency has the authority to govern learning for the nation’s approximately 
18,000 police agencies or 31,000 fire agencies, for example.  
However, the literature does continually point to one institutional example—
CALL—designed effectively to learn for the military.87 This example suggests a tie 
between the effectiveness of organizational learning and the need to cultivate a culture of 
learning. Foley, Griffin, and McCartney show value in an organization’s taking ownership 
of the learning process to enhance organizational learning objectives.88 A collective-action 
problem could exist in homeland security—meaning the number of entities involved in a 
high-threat incident is so vast that no one actually takes ownership of the problem. Foley 
highlights a key analogous situation and explains the British army’s learning process as 
follows: 
                                               
83 Michael G. Jacobides, “Don’t Let This Crisis Go to Waste!,” Business Strategy Review 20, no. 3 
(Autumn 2009): 70–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8616.2009.00618.x. 
84 Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster Policy Change after Catastrophic Events, American 
Governance and Public Policy Series (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006). 
85 Dominic Elliott, “The Failure of Organizational Learning from Crisis—A Matter of Life and 
Death?,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 17, no. 3 (September 2009): 157–68, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2009.00576.x. 
86 “LLIS in the HSDL,” Center for Homeland Defense and Security, accessed November 8, 2019, 
https://www.hsdl.org/c/llis-in-the-hsdl/. 
87 Baird, Holland, and Deacon, “Learning from Action.” 
88 Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin, and Helen McCartney, “‘Transformation in Contact’: Learning the 
Lessons of Modern War,” International Affairs 87, no. 2 (March 2011): 253–70, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1468-2346.2011.00972.x. 
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By recombining doctrine, development, and training, and placing 
responsibility for lessons firmly within this organization, the British army 
took a conscious decision to make the structural changes necessary to enable 
wider army transformation. In essence the ability to learn from front-line 
experience was elevated in status and given greater resources and its further 
development established as a key priority.89 
These references suggest that operations research needs to be grounded in a “learning 
culture,” which has to this point only been given sparse national resources.90 This learning 
culture currently depends on the individual agency’s taking ownership of the learning 
needed as no similar national-level agency exists for the homeland security community. 
The ability to capture information quickly, or in near real-time has implications for 
operations research. In the military literature, Finkel pins learning to the need for speed, 
which ultimately is an output of established doctrine.91 He slices doctrinal innovation into 
four “strata,” the last of which—fast learning and quick transmittal of learned lessons 
throughout the organization—may have the greatest applicability to the homeland security 
enterprise but is scant in actual homeland security–related literature. Finkel surmises the 
following process: 
[The] fourth stratum deals with real-time learning, not with learning for 
lessons from past wars. . . . [A]n important factor in recoverability from 
technological and doctrinal surprise is the ability to derive lessons while the 
surprise is taking place, that is devising immediate solutions and circulating 
them throughout the army.92  
Although Finkel does not use the term innovation, the description given suggests 
innovation of tactics, which would be a fitting classifier for his sentiment. Foley and 
colleagues support this claim in what they deem as the need for “transformation in 
contact.”93 Their criticism suggests that learning outside the near real-time of military 
events is less than useful, especially if doctrinal surprise occurs. In addition, no work has 
                                               
89 Foley, Griffin, and McCartney, 262. 
90 For an example of learning built into an organizational culture, see Baird, Holland, and Deacon, 
“Learning from Action”; U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Center for Army Lessons Learned.” 
91 Finkel, On Flexibility, 111–20. 
92 Finkel, 111. 
93 Foley, Griffin, and McCartney, “Transformation in Contact,” 253. 
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shown an optimal dissemination mechanism for an after-action report in homeland 
security. 
In conclusion, the intersection of organizational learning, knowledge management, 
and operations research represents a body of knowledge that has not been fully explored as 
it relates to homeland security generally and high-threat response specifically. This 
trivariate abstraction represents elements of both innovation and sensemaking. To that end, 
the most appropriate definition for organizational learning relative to this thesis may be 
Hedberg’s, which “includes both the processes whereby organizations adjust themselves 
defensively to reality, and the processes whereby knowledge is used offensively to improve 
the fit between organizations and their environments.”94 After-action reporting represents 
the dominant learning mechanism currently employed by homeland security but has been 
borrowed blindly from the military. Within several military organizations, lessons learned 
are a minor part of a larger organizational strategy of a culture of learning. Achieving a 
culture of learning and capturing data quickly with richer theoretical processes of learning, 
vis-à-vis double-loop learning mechanisms, have not been demonstrated as an attainable 
reality and represent an area for future research not sufficiently evaluated by the current 
literature. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Organizations must learn to evolve. Emergency services, first responders, and 
counterterrorism units must not only evolve but do so in a rapid fashion when tactics and 
adversaries change. Organizational learning as an academic field is only about 50 years 
old.95 Less is known about the extent to which police, fire, EMS, and emergency 
management learn and what best practices are most applicable for optimizing 
organizational learning. Mastliglio et al. argue that little is known about the AAR, the 
                                               
94 Bo Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn,” in Handbook of Organizational Design, ed. 
Paul C. Nystrom and William H. Starbuck, vol. 1, Adapting Organizations to Their Environments (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3–27. 
95 Roland K. Yeo, “Revisiting the Roots of Learning Organization: A Synthesis of the Learning 
Organization Literature,” Learning Organization 12, no. 4 (2005): 368, https://doi.org/10.1108/
09696470510599145. 
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primary tool for military organizations to learn, and the extent to which it enhances 
practice.96 By extension, this idea applies to the paramilitary environment of homeland 
security, where even less is known. 
Although after-action reports and lessons learned pervade the HSE after major 
incidents, they lag incidents. And the influence and effectiveness of these learning tools in 
nation-wide tactics have not been sufficiently evaluated. Given that high-threat incidents 
are increasing in number and mortality, the HSE must evaluate increasing timeliness and 
effectiveness of learning. This thesis seeks to add to the body of knowledge of 
organizational learning for the HSE to do just that. If not addressed, the gaps articulated 
for the HSE have high-impact consequences. Optimized organizational learning for 
homeland security ultimately equates to saving lives and property. 
F. THESIS ROADMAP 
For the chapters that follow, I researched how organizations succeeded in 
organizational learning and demonstrated that speed was not a limiting factor. Chapter II 
compares and contrasts two different learning methods from the same tragic incident: the 
1 October massacre. It compares a traditional government AAR process with a novel near 
real-time deployment and interview model. Likewise, Chapter III investigates the success 
of CALL while Chapter IV evaluates quick learning by the National Transportation Safety 
Board. Chapter V summarizes the conclusions and recommendations, including a 
framework for real-time learning, and Chapter VI concludes with issues surrounding 
implementation, limitations of the research, and future areas to explore in the homeland 
security enterprise. 
  
                                               
96 Thomas Mastiglio et al., Current Practice and Theoretical Foundations of the After Action Review 
(Arlington, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2011), v, http://www.dtic.
mil/docs/citations/ADA544543. 
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II. 1 OCTOBER EXEMPLARS 
There’s only one thing more painful than learning from experience, and that 
is not learning from experience.  
 —Archibald MacLeish 
In our chosen profession of policing, we often cannot control what takes 
place on the ground that we have been commissioned to protect and serve. 
. . . Taking a critical look at LVMPD’s performance—so the Agency and 
others in the profession can learn from how we responded—is a valuable 
exercise. A comprehensive review of our work can save lives, which is the 
ultimate goal of first responders.  
 —Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department97 
A. BACKGROUND: THE MOST LETHAL MASS SHOOTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
On October 1, 2017, the community of Las Vegas, Nevada, and the entire nation 
experienced the worst shooting massacre in U.S. history. Fifty-nine souls were heinously 
murdered and 850 injured due to the still-unknown motivations of one deranged individual 
displaying advanced tactics.98 Several agencies, including the Las Vegas Metropolitan 
Police Department (LVMPD) and FEMA, were called to respond to the incident and 
produced written reports outlining the response to that event.99 The investigative report 
was published on January 18, 2018—99 days after the event. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s AAR was published on August 24, 2018—327 days after the event. 
And the official Las Vegas after-action report was published on June 6, 2019—613 days 
                                               
97 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report (Las Vegas: Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department, 2019), 1, https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/1_October_AAR_
Final_06062019.pdf. 
98 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 1. The death toll was 
raised to 59 after a victim died on November 15, 2019, months after the publication of the official AAR. 
This number does not include the perpetrator. See Danielle Wallace, “Las Vegas Massacre Death Toll 
Rises after Southern California Woman’s Death,” Fox News, November 19, 2019, https://www.foxnews.
com/us/las-vegas-massacre-death-toll-rises-after-southern-california-womans-death. 
99 The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) had law enforcement jurisdiction for the 
incident, and the City of Las Vegas asked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to execute 
an all-hazards review. 
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after the event. The LVMPD’s report focuses primarily on law enforcement operations 
whereas FEMA’s report summarizes pre-incident capability of both police and fire as well 
as other resource management and community recovery concerns. In both AARs, 
methodology, confidentiality, distribution, and analysis resemble one another, comparable 
to other government-authored AARs. In sum, these after-action reports encompass many 
facets of the response across multiple disciplines and share consistent formats with 
numerous after-action reports from high-threat events in recent years in terms of scope, 
collection methods, timeframes, and distribution. 
This chapter compares three official after-action reports: the one produced by 
FEMA, the one produced by the LVMPD for investigative purposes (LVMPDa), and the 
one produced by the LVMPD for response purposes (LVMPDb). These three were 
compared with incident information collected by a non-profit research team, the HTI, 
including this author, which used an alternative format to the standard AAR to collect data 
in near real-time.100 Table 2 compares the aforementioned learning tools. 
  
                                               
100 The official after-action reports of FEMA and the LVMPD are combined for discussion here 
because of their similar methods and official government authorship. 
Table 2. Learning Product Comparisons 
LVMPD(a) LVMPD(b) FEMA HTI 
Days to 
produce 99 613 327 5 
Page count 81 158 61 8 
Purpose Accountability of investigation 
Response 
performance/internal 
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B. PROCESS: OFFICIAL AAR METHODOLOGY
Las Vegas and FEMA had similar learning methodologies. A comparison of the 
two is instructive when taken as an aggregate against an alternative methodology. Given 
that there were subtle differences in data collection and timeliness, each is separated for 
specificity. 
1. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
The LVMPD(b) began official collection activities in October 2017. Although the 
final after-action report concentrated on the efforts, tactics, and efforts of the LVMPD, the 
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team collected data from a wide variety of multiagency and multidisciplinary partners. 
These partners included Clark County Fire Department (CCFD), the Henderson Police 
Department, the North Las Vegas Police Department, FEMA, the Las Vegas Fire and 
Rescue Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.101 All of these response entities, except for FEMA, had 
significant responsibilities during the first operational period of the incident.102  
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department used multiple sources to collect 
data for the after-action report. First, it surveyed all department personnel to ascertain any 
duties performed on the night of the active-shooter incident. The LVMPD used Survey 
Monkey to ask 22 questions, which generated 672 responses.103 According to the LVMPD, 
all respondents answered  
a general set of questions . . . focusing on the interviewees’ first notification 
of the incident, initial response, actions taken, defined roles, and post-
incident and after-action reflections. Interview questions focused on the 
specific roles of the interviewees, but participants received a standardized 
set of instructions.”104  
According to the LVMPD, it interviewed an additional 650 personnel, “ensuring internal 
consistency and allowing themes and trends to be identified more readily.”105 However, 
the interview format was not standardized, and interviews took place both in individual 
and multiple responder settings. 
After the survey, personnel were then directed by LVMPD Administrative Notice 
AN-017-17 to complete a follow-up narrative. According to the LVMPD, “Approximately 
500 reports were submitted and thoroughly reviewed. . . . On February 20, 2018, a similar 
request was distributed to civilian employees, including dispatch and crime scene 
                                               
101 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 6. 
102 The timeline stipulated in FEMA’s AAR coincides with the period between the start of the event at 
10:05 p.m. on October 1 and Clark County Fire Department’s termination of command at 7:32 a.m. on 
October 2. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018), 2, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=814668. 
103 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 8. 
104 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 8. 
105 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 7. 
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investigators,” soliciting information and generating nearly 100 responses.106 Other mixed 
methods of instrumentation included radio traffic, calls to the 9-1-1 center, and officer-
worn body camera footage. Over 3,000 officer-worn cameras were active on the night of 
1 October, and 47 personnel accountability reports were included in the AAR’s 
documentation.107 
a. Confidentiality 
Since the LVMPD requested that employees respond to both surveys and written 
requests for follow-up documentation, as required by Administrative Notice AN-017-17, 
the AAR team knew the respondents’ identities. Confidentiality for the data collection was 
not an issue as no LVMPD employee declined a follow-up interview. Nevertheless, 
interviews were not recorded. The LVMPD did not include personally identifiable 
information in the official after-action outside the names of several AAR team members; 
individual responses were not published. 
b. AAR Distribution 
The official 1 October After-Action Report produced by the LVMPD was 
completed on June 6, 2019, and officially released to the public on July 10, 2019. A press 
conference by the LVMPD outlined the key details of the report for the media and 
community prior to its distribution. Given the incident’s gravity, the AAR was immediately 
distributed electronically to multiple agencies and disciplines via electronic mail. The 
distribution for the FEMA-authored AAR resembled that of the Las Vegas products. 
FEMA released the AAR to the public via the Homeland Security Digital Library, 
maintained by the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.108 Numerous government entities, including the Clark County Fire Department, 
                                               
106 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 8. 
107 Wallace, “Las Vegas Massacre Death Toll Rises.” 
108 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report. 
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announced the release, which furthered distribution efforts as both media and related 
communities of interest took note.109 
2. FEMA 
The CCFD and the LVMPD also asked FEMA to write a report. According to the 
separate LVMPD(b) AAR, its purpose “was to review the integrated response to 1 October 
between the fire department and law enforcement.”110 The report, while issued under 
FEMA’s authority, relied heavily on data collected from each agency and principal 
members of FEMA’s team from Las Vegas, including the CCFD, Emergency 
Management, and Multi-Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities personnel. Prior 
to the demobilization of the event, Las Vegas leadership decided to start the learning 
process by establishing the Route 91 Task Force on October 2.111 The task force consisted 
of four employees of the CCFD and three police officers from the LVMPD, who in total 
surveyed 24 “departments and/or offices” in the course of the AAR. For FEMA’s report, 
the LVMPD also used a written survey distributed to the entire department to solicit a 
response from any member who participated in the incident. The police department 
received 672 responses. FEMA’s task force used mixed methods for collecting response 
data, including a review of the radio and dispatch recordings, written surveys, and 
debriefs.112 
  
                                               
109 Erik Pappa, “FEMA Releases 1 October After-Action Report,” Clark County, Nevada, August 27, 
2018, https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/public-communications/news/Pages/FEMA-Releases-1-October-
After-action-Report.aspx; “FEMA Releases Report on Vegas Shooting,” Firehouse, September 5, 2018, 
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110 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 10. 
111 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 2. The HTI research team 
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112 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2. 
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C. CASE STUDY: THE HIGH-THREAT INSTITUTE’S FLY TEAM 
Founded in December 2016, the HTI is a non-profit grassroots effort  
focused on developing an innovative framework for instituting a public 
safety-oriented platform of research, training, and education. This 
innovative framework integrates law enforcement, fire services, and 
emergency medical personnel to more efficiently and effectively respond to 
and prevent evolving scenarios of atypical emergencies and complex 
attacks.113  
Imitating the successful grassroots model of the Committee for Tactical Emergency 
Casualty Care, whereby a multi-disciplinary group of experienced professionals elevates 
operational gaps in civilian high-threat response, the group’s initial scope centered on 
active violent events; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives response; 
intelligence sharing and optimization, fire as a weapon, civil disturbances, and future 
threats.114 Because these homeland security areas—often inadequately addressed or 
funded—have highly consequential impacts, the group felt it could offer guidance to the 
broader response community.  
1. AAR 
In 2017, the HTI assembled a team of researchers, including this author, to test a 
concept of operations for near real-time learning from a high-threat event. The team, 
designated as the “Fly Team,” resembled other no-notice deployment teams.115 The HTI 
activated the research team on the morning of October 2, 2017, and assembled in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, within 23 hours of the incident’s initiation. At 6:00 a.m. on Wednesday, 
October 4, 2017, the HTI team awoke to begin its day of data collection. This date was the 
beginning of the third operational period of the incident for emergency services, and data 
collection was well underway before the last notification to next of kin was made to a 
                                               
113 “Home Page,” High Threat Institute, last updated February 4, 2020, http://highthreatinstitute.org/. 
114 In the case of the Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care, the issue was confined to the 
medical response to high-threat events and the appropriate civilian translation of medical lessons learned 
from the military experience rather than blind adoption of principles that may or may not apply. 
115 Other examples include the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and Urban Search and Rescue teams maintained by FEMA. 
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victim’s family at 9:34 a.m.116 As the team prepared to travel, data collection began in 
earnest with a review of open-source incident data that became available to the deploying 
team to plan its approach to structured interviews. 
a. Methodology  
On the morning of October 3, the research team began to meet with persons directly 
involved with the incident. It held informal interviews that varied in length, from 
approximately 45 minutes to two and a half hours, depending on the amount of relatable 
information the interviewee had to share. All participants were informed before the start of 
the interview that the researchers would not record the interview except for handwritten 
notes in response to direct and open-ended questions regarding preparation and response. 
The researchers explained the purpose of the research to interviewees, which was to 
compile a snapshot of the incident response within a compressed timeframe.  
The interview team conducted a total of eight interviews, with one interview as a 
follow-up; however, the latter interview was adjusted for a different purpose and scope 
with different questions. Interviewees were not compensated for their time. The researchers 
returned home after two days of extensive interviews. The HTI shared the raw data and 
interview notes internally for analysis, discussion, and quick sensemaking of the incident 
among a group uninvolved yet still knowledgeable in interagency and atypical threat 
procedures.  
b. Confidentiality  
The information was shared with other SMEs from the HTI to deconstruct the 
incident and apply high-level analysis. All participants were informed that the data 
captured would be anonymized if distributed outside the HTI. Only the researchers 
conducting the interviews and the limited HTI SME group knew the identity of the 
respondents. Instructions were clear that responses would be nonattributable if extrapolated 
so that participants would feel comfortable freely discussing the incident. 
                                               
116 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 22. 
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2. Analysis and Limitations 
The HTI’s grassroots effort limited the number of assets researchers could deploy. 
Although initially planning two days of interviews, the amount of time needed to conduct 
interviews, travel to interviews, collate the data, and set up new interviews far exceeded 
this timeframe. Furthermore, although only one team of two researchers worked the 
incident, multiple teams of researchers could have worked in parallel to capture more data. 
Backend support to assist the forward-deployed team was limited. The deployed 
team handled everything from travel logistics to monitoring open-source information as 
the incident unfolded. The relative newness of the concept also proved to be an 
impediment. For example, researchers leveraged personal and professional contacts to 
secure interviewees. At the start of the interviews, depending on the degree of the 
interviewee’s familiarity with the researcher, explaining why the HTI team was there cost 
valuable time. The deployment, while attempting to provide a proof of concept, relied on 
the expertise of the HTI to generate questions based on the respondents’ role and 
responsibilities. No templated or standardized question sets existed. 
3. Data 
The official 1 October After-Action Report took 613 days to distribute whereas the 
HTI’s data-gathering effort took only five. Although the scope, intent, and breadth of the 
government-authored reports are not comparable to the HTI’s report, the latter contained 
many facts of the incident that were published in the final report. A coded matrix separating 
the data into themes was completed nine days after the incident. The official data were 
collated from one of three official after-action reports (OARs): the LVMPD’s criminal 
report, the LVMPD’s AAR, and FEMA’s AAR.117 The AAR reference and HTI statement 
correlated the data with contextual relevance provided. Data were broken down into 
significant themes for clerical ease and included the following for review: general incident 
response, medical, integration, incident command, community recovery, and specialized 
                                               
117 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, LVMPD Preliminary Investigative Report: 1 October/
Mass Casualty Shooting (Las Vegas: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 2018), Homeland 
Security Digital Library; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report. 
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response. All of the comparative findings between the HTI process and the OARs are listed 
in the Appendix. The following sub-sections outline the 26 findings across six sub-themes 
of high-threat response. Sensemaking for each finding is provided, not to critique the 1 
October response specifically but to show that quick learning was possible for the event 
itself and, in some cases, had external validity to others outside the immediate response. 
a. General Incident Response 
(1) After the original shooting, police received multiple calls of additional 
shooters. 
For planning purposes, this was a key finding for several reasons. First, the number 
of responders involved and the geography needing coverage make situational awareness 
difficult. Likewise, staffing the event appropriately is challenging, especially in the 
beginning stages of the incident. Distractor calls should be expected and planned for, 
meaning additional resources may need to be ordered early in the incident to address this 
need. Second, mechanisms should be employed to rapidly deconflict actual versus 
perceived incidents. This deconfliction requires rapid deployment, strong relationships 
with commercial partners, optimized information-sharing pathways between response 
agencies, and updated contact lists. 
(2) The assailant actively surveilled police response and anticipated tactics. 
This finding shows that the assailant actively planned for the law enforcement 
response. This conclusion means the first responder community should expect this 
behavior from assailants as copy cats are always likely, especially when attacks are 
successful.118 Capturing such a granular yet important detail, in near real-time, validates 
the approach and provides value for future efforts. Ultimately, this finding, if transmitted 
early, helps to prepare against complacency but can ultimately save responder lives if 
multiple similar incidents take place. An example would be a complex coordinated attack 
scenario. 
                                               




Figure 2. 32nd Floor Diagram of the MGM during the 1 October 
Incident119 
(3) Accurate victim counts and patterns of injury were captured. 
Understanding the magnitude of the event early is critical for planning purposes. 
Further, understanding not only how many are injured but also how they are injured is 
important for high-threat events. Injury patterns in civilian wounding are unequivocally 
different from combat wounds and must be planned for in terms of equipment, training, 
and types of responders needed.120 Notably, the HTI effort collected similar data, as well 
                                               
119 Source: “Here’s a Timeline of the Las Vegas Shooting—with the Crucial Detail Police Left Out 
Last Time,” Los Angeles Times, October 9, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-vegas-shooting-
timeline-revised-20171009-story.html. The floor schematic shows multiple surveillance devices placed by 
the assailant. 
120 Babak Sarani et al., “Wounding Patterns Based on Firearm Type in Civilian Public Mass Shootings 
in the United States,” Journal of the American College of Surgeons 228, no. 3 (March 2019): 228–34, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2018.11.014; E. Reed Smith, Geoff Shapiro, and Babak Sarani, “Fatal 
Wounding Pattern and Causes of Potentially Preventable Death following the Pulse Night Club Shooting 
Event,” Prehospital Emergency Care 22, no. 6 (2018): 662–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/10903127.2018.
1459980. 
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as processed and disseminated the information in far less time. The information created 
knowledge and relevance for the community, exhibiting formal knowledge transmission. 
(4) Planning efforts for the music festival were dictated by the number of 
personnel assigned to special events planning. 
Special events planning is a sub-specialty of police and fire/EMS response 
planning. Balancing the potential needs of an incident with complete accuracy poses great 
difficulty. The fire department’s lack of full-time representatives in the special events 
planning process could be indicative of other failures of the incident response. 
(5) An insider presence helped to narrow the location of the shooter for the 
authorities. 
Although the exact details of the initial reports to the HTI differ slightly from the 
actual details, the finding is clear. An employee of the hotel helped narrow down the 
location of the shooter. This finding is significant—despite the size of the venue, law 
enforcement’s having near real-time and accurate information of the location of the shooter 
can significantly accelerate threat mitigation. 
(6) Recognizing the initial response dynamics of responding officers pursuing 
the immediate threat afforded general situational awareness.  
Understanding the tactics of initial officers and their response is paramount to 
understanding the incident. Questions emerge as to what equipment was available, what 
officers knew, and when they knew it. Furthermore, the shooting took place for 
approximately 10–11 minutes, but responders did not enter until 65 minutes later.121 This 
detail is important for planning future responses to high-threat events. 
For the high-threat community, this finding suggests a change in response posture. 
An active shooter, even with no active shooting, is still a direct and immediate threat. The 
collapse of the hot zone, which can aid in victim access, treatment, and transport, cannot 
occur as effectively as in a warm zone. 
                                               
121 The LVMPD’s investigative report timeline shows that the shooting began at 10:05 p.m., and no 
shots were reported after 10:15 p.m. Explosive entry to the hotel room occurred at 11:20 p.m. 
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(7) Incursion onto the active runway at McCarran International Airport had 
significant response implications.  
Airport involvement helped to underpin the severity and magnitude of the event. It 
also underscores how response dynamics might be extrapolated to other special events in 
and around critical infrastructure and how “spillover” occurs. It also helps to quantify the 
number of resources needed to mitigate such an event and the magnitude of response issues 
for the incident commander. 
(8) The planning for the after-action review began immediately. 
This quick response is key for any department that experiences a high-threat event 
like 1 October. The planning began immediately for lessons learned, and the highest levels 
of the organization supported it. 
(9) The hotel prompted a response to the assailant’s room. This information 
was conveyed via building intelligence from inside the room, which was 
monitored at a central control panel. 
Understanding the response posture of the private entity before the arrival of 
professional (sworn) responders is important. Specific to this incident, the HTI understood 
that an MGM employee had encountered the situation first and witnessed both the actions 
of the individual and the security posture of the corporation. Further, building information 
is not appropriately harnessed in many aspects of emergency response because the 
information is not transferred to responders. In this case, room alarms that prompted staff 
to investigate provided new information to many response professionals. Generally, 
camera systems are sometimes exploited during active-shooter incidents by responding 
officers not on the initial contact team.122  
Leveraging this information in a timely fashion is critical for emergency 
responders. Entry to the room was delayed even though sensors in the room detected no 
                                               
122 In the active-shooter incident at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, responding officers 
attempted to use CCTV. Their efforts were unsuccessful when they learned the video they were viewing 
was not in real time. See Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission, Initial Report 
(Tallahassee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement, January 2, 2019), 26–27, http://www.fdle.state.
fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf. 
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movement. Leveraging in-room data, such as motion sensors or heat detectors, in real time 
for incident response is unexplored in the literature. This specific finding suggests 
emergency responders should study how to leverage such information. According to the 
official timeline, the assailant “fired two separate volleys of an unknown number of rounds 
into the Las Vegas Village area” at 10:15 p.m.123 According to the LVMPD’s report, at 
10:18 p.m., “the heat detection indicator from inside Room 32-135 detected no further 
readings.”124 The execution of the explosive breach of the hotel room was performed at 
11:20 p.m.125  
(10) Establishing facts of how the incident unfolded and what unit actions 
occurred gives preliminary data to assess response effectiveness. 
The way departments deploy is a function of their available equipment and staffing. 
Understanding the deployment model helps to ascertain the optimal response mechanism 
for an integrated response. 
b. Medical 
(1) Bleeding control equipment, specifically tourniquets, were not personally 
carried by the police. 
Major hemorrhage control is a key skill to prevent death in hemorrhagic shock. The 
fact that tourniquets were kept in vehicles and not mandated to be carried could have 
affected morbidity and mortality.  
(2) Law enforcement provided immediate support to area hospitals to assist 
with scene stabilization and hospital security. 
The unbelievable number of injured patients necessitated local assistance from area 
hospitals. This fact is critical in establishing reasonable expectations to assist medical 
facilities in dealing with the huge influx of injured, family members, walking wounded, 
and potentially nefarious actors. Supporting local hospital operations in the middle of a 
                                               
123 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, LVMPD Preliminary Investigative Report, 36. 
124 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 37. 
125 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 37. 
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complex incident should now be considered a standard of operations, given the success of 
the 1 October incident in assisting local facilities. 
(3) Despite limited time, information, and access, authorities conducted a fairly 
accurate patient count. 
As incident complexity increases and patient counts rise, resource and logistical 
requirements become overwhelming. Receiving accurate patient count information as 
wells as patterns of injury allows non-affected entities to overlay their capabilities on a 
similar simulated event type in their jurisdiction for planning purposes. 
c. Integration 
(1) Deployed rescue task forces had limited utility in this particular incident, 
identifying accountability and discipline of response as concerns. 
The rescue task force is a warm zone model that mitigates the risk for Fire/EMS 
personnel by assigning law enforcement as close force protection and providing enhanced 
personal protective equipment. The goal is to access the active violent incident scene 
quicker to prevent deaths and provide rapid life-saving measures. The data show the need 
for a flexible rescue task force system as an optimal deployment model. A specific 
example, such as four officers with two or three firefighter/EMTs, may not be possible 
given resource constraints of a large geographic footprint. The conclusion from the data 
also shows the need to train to avoid freelancing and self-deployment, which are a major 
concern for law enforcement and fire/EMS.  
(2) All warm zones are not created alike, and specific tactics must be adjusted 
based on incident dynamics. 
This data point shows that a warm zone differs depending on incident dynamics. A 
large open-air venue must be treated differently from the interior of a school. Because 
warm zones can vastly differ, this finding demonstrates the need for law enforcement to 
train and collapse the hot zone as quickly as possible. For this incident, the primary area of 
concern remained “hot” for over an hour, even though the assailant had self-terminated 
after shooting for only 10 minutes. The fact that the actual highest-threat window was only 
ten minutes long highlights the need for very specific and tight multiagency coordination. 
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This finding further emphasizes how the dynamics of initial efficient law enforcement 
response can affect other responding agencies with different response objectives. 
(3) Rescue task forces operated in multiple zones of threat. 
The rescue task force is one of four appropriate warm zone models, according to 
the national standard.126 The composition of a rescue task force is appropriately left up to 
the jurisdiction to manage based on training, available resources, and the deployment 
model. Warm zone operations must be broad to allow for multiple configurations of 
responders based on the constraints of the incident. This finding also shows that when 
confronted with the injured, providers may choose to assume more a personal threat than 
policy substantiates. Having informed procedures for how and when to deploy and a 
reasonable expectation of success will aid other departments when faced with similar 
circumstances. 
d. Incident Command 
(1) The unified command suffered specific challenges related to this complex 
incident but ones not easily anticipated. 
In large incidents, especially in the beginning, the incident command can be 
overloaded with information. Applying a system and structure to manage the chaos is 
critical for incident stabilization. Especially in active-violence incidents, the unified 
command often proves a point of failure when multiple agencies with competing priorities 
respond. Here, complexities within the incident may have impeded an optimal transition to 
a unified command, which was eventually established. Also, having command aides or 
assigning command officers to monitor various aspects of the radio can prevent 
information overload for large-scale incidents. 
                                               
126 National Fire Protection Agency, Standard for Active Shooter and Hostile Event Response, NFPA 
3000 (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Agency, 2018), 16. 
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(2) Prior to the shooting, the fire department was not represented in the 
command post. 
The relevance of this finding indicates that a unified command was not pre-
established between agencies. Such an agreement might have allowed for greater 
situational awareness of the incident and a smoother transition to rescue operations. Special 
events planning must not occur in a vacuum, and even during steady-state operations, a 
unified command should be pre-established at all major events. 
(3) The initial command post for both police and fire became the hot zone. 
Obtaining an overall understanding of incident command dynamics so quickly with 
the HTI method suggests that other first responders can preplan for this or a similar incident 
in their communities. This finding shows that in a short period, some of those complexities 
could be determined and shared with the first-responder community. 
e. Community Recovery 
(1) The city quickly stood up a family assistance center. 
Support services, such as a family assistance center (FAC), increase the resiliency 
of a community in recovering from such a tragic event as the 1 October incident. Yet many 
jurisdictions have no formal policy, procedure, plan, or template to accomplish this 
important task. The importance of the center’s work, as it was flooded with visitors almost 
immediately, was incredible. The need to prioritize this action cannot be underestimated 
and should be shared. 
(2) Donations at the FAC require management.  
The research team visited the FAC as soon as the interviews started and had 
unfettered access to the site. This type of near real-time knowledge sharing provides a 
baseline for discussing a model FAM and its importance to the community in contributing 
to resiliency. Donation management is just one example that the team witnessed of a 
service provided and coordinated at the FAC. 
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(3) The FAC is a complicated resource working to help mitigate the event. Las 
Vegas requested SMEs early to assist with setting up and optimizing the 
work of the FAC for this mass-casualty event. 
Because the City of Orlando had experienced a mass-fatality event before the 
1 October incident, its emergency management officials rendered assistance organizing the 
FAC. While the AARs highlight that the FBI was called in to assist in this process, which 
may certainly have been the case, the research team also personally met City of Orlando 
emergency management officials—not the FBI—who helped establish and optimize the 
FAC. This near real-time assistance helped Vegas immensely in organizing its FAC and 
should be considered a best practice for those that may be unfamiliar in the operations and 
needs of such a center. Understanding this critical factor so shortly after the incident was 
critical in comprehending the smooth operation witnessed at the Vegas FAC. This point in 
the HTI process—in five days versus 613—realized a fact that has been misinterpreted in 
the lengthier AAR. 
f. Specialized Response Activities 
(1) Distractor events called out the bomb squad to investigate. 
During active-violence incidents, especially active-shooter events, specialty teams 
such as bomb squads are critically important. Suspicious vehicles, bags, and persons 
become a resource drain, and well-intended calls pour in as the public increases awareness 
of the incident. Understanding the initial and subsequent actions of this team is important 
for general incident response dynamics, especially as the use, or threat of use, of explosives 
by threat actors becomes commonplace.  
(2) The assailant had explosives in his vehicle. 
Confirming that the assailant used explosives in his vehicle should heighten the 
response of first responders and increase the planning efforts of those not directly involved 
in this incident. Tannerite is a continued threat for emergency personnel as it is easily 
obtainable and can cause great damage. The issues associated with accessing the assailant’s 
vehicle should be used as a training scenario for others. 
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(3) Law enforcement found the shooter dead after a prolonged period of being 
barricaded and quiet. The bomb squad was not used in the shooter’s room. 
This is an interesting point because the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team 
used explosives to gain entry into the assailant’s room. Theoretically, that could alter the 
results of a K-9 sweep of the area and suggests a certified bomb technician might be 
interested in surveying the rest of the room for explosive threats. Responders should expect 
multiple threats including explosives in an active assailant scenario and be cognizant of 
secondary devices designed to injure response personnel. 
(4) The assailant fashioned a makeshift device to protect his air supply from 
either propellant being fired or gas potential deployed by police personnel. 
The assailant was also prepared to extinguish a fire if needed, using 
equipment not commonly found in a hotel room, suggesting he also brought 
the extinguisher with him. 
A scuba mask with makeshift hose and tubing was also recovered in the evidence 
list.127 This fact demonstrates the assailant’s premediated preparedness of the police 
response and his understanding of advanced tactics. He had also searched SWAT tactics 
online.128 Understanding how assailants optimize against emergency responders is crucial 
in the preparation and advancement of responder tactics. 
D. DISCUSSION 
The aforementioned data indicate the ability to collect near real-time information 
from a high-threat incident, which may be valuable for the first-responder community. Yet 
capturing key incident details shortly after incidents and transmitting them to other experts 
for sensemaking do not currently occur. Instead, producing an official AAR requires a 
significant amount of time. If an adversary uses novel tactics, responders need to make 
sense of that information quickly and build capacity to defeat the attacker. For example, a 
quick shift in active-shooter tactics after Columbine could have made threat mitigation a 
patrol function or made fire and EMS perform warm zone operations. 
                                               
127 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, LVMPD Preliminary Investigative Report, 42. 
128 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 46. 
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Certainly, the author concedes multiple limitations with the first iteration of this fly 
team concept. Its data collection effort focused quite narrowly, and time, funding, and the 
number of personnel limited the efforts. However, even the small number of comparisons 
in the previous section indicate the potential for quicker learning for the homeland security 
enterprise. The lack of a core set of questions represents both a limitation and a benefit. 
While this deficit might limit repeatability, the researchers could still concentrate on 
specific areas of their expertise that may have not have been uncovered with key points nor 
pinpointed in a standardized question set. 
Although FEMA provides support to state and local governments after catastrophic 
incidents, it lacks the mandate to conduct after-action reviews. FEMA’s after-action review 
of the event, despite being outside its purpose or mission, benefited the city. FEMA and 
Las Vegas worked closely on many of these issues in a simulated fashion while hosting a 
Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Workshop Series in 2012.129 The workshops assessed 
local capabilities in response to a complex terrorism event and the effectiveness of 
emergency services in areas applicable to the 1 October incident, such as information 
sharing, integration efforts, tactical operations, and command competency. The series was 
demonstrated to increase jurisdictional capacity to mitigate a complex coordinated 
attack.130 However, the relationship between FEMA and Las Vegas may be too collegial 
for a truly dispassionate and impartial assessment as other major events have contracted 
with objective third parties to perform the AAR.131 In the LVMPD’s case, because it 
assessed itself in the after-action report, the potential for bias and blind spots exists. 
Regarding FEMA’s AAR, the agency compiled the report “with the intent of distributing 
best practices and lessons learned for other communities around the country to better prepare 
for a mass casualty incident should one occur. . . . It was the intent of the agencies involved 
                                               
129 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 5. 
130 Jared Goff, “Prospective Vigilance: Assessing Complex Coordinated Attack Preparedness 
Programs” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 56, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/1053254.pdf. 
131 Independent examples include industry advocacy groups such as the Police Foundation in the case 
of the Pulse nightclub shooting or private contractors such as TriData in the case of the Aurora, Colorado, 
movie theater shooting. 
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to provide this information as timely as possible.132 Whether 327 days is considered timely, 
or actionable for new learning, is debatable. 
1. Timeliness 
In only 23 hours, the team moved to collect near real-time data. Although the 
LVMPD and CCFD had begun planning to conduct an AAR, they were still within the 
operational periods of the incident, and recovery efforts were ongoing. The results indicate 
that the quick HTI data collection process positively correlates with the official after-action 
reports of the government, supporting it as a viable adjunct to the AAR process. Although 
it is not a replacement for any official learning process, the HTI fly team method has 
demonstrated value in collecting rapid knowledge within a highly complex incident. 
Notably, the team had to perform data collection while simultaneously accessing 
responders for interviews.  
Finally, just-in-time research may have additional benefits if civilians have been 
involved in a high-threat event. Professional responders, especially in emergency services, 
recognize that large incidents generally have an AAR or official learning process 
associated with the event. Therefore, they may more readily recall their actions or be able 
to describe them at points more distant in the future. Civilians, on the other hand, who 
generally have no stress inoculation and are not routinely exposed to high-threat events, 
may not retain thoughts, feelings, and emotions with specificity or accuracy for as long. 
Understanding the immediate response, actions, and sensemaking of civilians quickly is 
also an area to be explored for future research. 
2. Sensemaking 
Quick data collection is one important piece of the learning process. Likewise, 
reporting facts of the incident aligns more closely with single-loop learning than the 
double-loop variety, which may have more impact as tactics, technology, or responder 
assumptions shift. Sensemaking of the incident must occur in a timely way to analyze the 
facts for new insights and meaning. Doing so presents a two-fold problem: accurately 
                                               
132 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, i. 
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gaining the information quickly, and then processing acquired knowledge for meaning and 
relevance to share it appropriately. 
Perspectives of an event change over time as both chemical and physical processes 
affect the brain. During high-stress events, the body releases neurotransmitters and 
catecholamines as a coping mechanism to deal with the event. The degree to which one 
remembers the facts, or reactions or actions within the event, may differ based on normal 
stress reactions. A complete AAR analysis would capture both short, medium, and long-
term memory to ensure data have not been missed. Medium and long-term memory are 
currently captured during the current AAR process; however, no process exists to 
immediately capture incident response data in real time or near real-time.  
Within the results of the experiment, some conclusions emerge in comparing the 
HTI approach to the traditional AAR approach. First, the data captured within five days 
are close enough to the data distributed after 99, 327, and 613 days, respectively. Assailant 
attack methods, response procedures, challenges encountered, injury type, casualty counts, 
and special circumstances generally correlate in both methods. Information that had 
external validity for the HSE—such as procedures for handling a warm zone with an 
elevated shooter, the need to collapse a hot zone and make entry quicker to confirm the 
assailant’s status, the use of pre-planning and active surveillance against police tactics, 
distractor calls that potentially change the incident from an isolated active shooter to a 
complex coordinated attack, and the missed opportunity to leverage building system 
intelligence—were all demonstrated in near real-time. This begs the question that if such 
meaningful data can be captured and shared so quickly, why would the HSE not capitalize 
on this approach if only for situational awareness? This effort could pay significant 
dividends as unaffected jurisdictions consume this information and assess their own 
capabilities as a planning tool. 
The official reports obtained the same information, potentially with finer 
granularity, but were they worth the wait? And the HTI demonstrated that even at time 
intervals, the official information could also be incorrect. The LVMPD(b) attributed the 
family assistance center assistance only to the FBI, when in fact the HTI research team met 
the non–law enforcement personnel sent from Orlando emergency management. This 
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conflicting information suggests that official reports can still get it wrong, as to who did 
what, even with so much time to produce the final product. Therefore, the output of an 
official report does not suggest sacrificing speed. And room for both methods exists to 
provide different value to the enterprise. 
The understated value to be found in the HTI approach is when an actor applies 
novel tactics that the HSE enterprise has not yet encountered. An example in this context 
was an active shooter from an elevated platform, which had not been seriously evaluated 
since 1966.133 The HTI quickly and appropriately captured specific difficulties in the 
response effort to this novel event and, through sensemaking, provided context generally 
for its community. Very granular pieces of novel data, such as the SCUBA mask and tubing 
staged at the scene by the assailant, were captured at both five days and 99 days, indicating 
the near real-time ability to be specific. Providing context around this data point for the 
entire HSE, such as implications for fire as a weapon within active-shooter response, gives 
the HTI approach additional validity and value not necessarily produced from an individual 
jurisdictional AAR.  
3. Dissemination 
HTI initially distributed notes to the group via email on October 6, 2017. As the 
notes provided a valuable snapshot of a high-threat multi-disciplinary effort, the 
anonymized results were coded into a matrix and separated into major themes: incident 
command, multidiscipline integration, community response, medical, and general. The 
codes applied to each theme consisted of the originating discipline of the respondent and a 
second code representing a subtheme. These subthemes included response mechanisms, 
information sharing, rescue task forces, staging, accountability, training, security/
screening, recommendations, equipment, communications, family assistance center, 
bystanders, patient transport, patient distribution, treatment, recovery, and atmospheric 
threat monitoring. The coded matrix was distributed on October 10, 2017. 
                                               
133 The incident occurred on August 1, 1966, when the assailant killed 17 and injured 31 in an active-
shooter event. Most of the killing occurred from a firing position on the tower observation deck at the 
University of Texas, above the 27th floor. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The data presented demonstrate that the HTI information, when compared to 
official after-action reports, proved salient enough to disseminate lessons to emergency 
responders across the country in near real-time. This process solves a major problem in the 
HSE by making post-major-incident learning accurate and timely, which is not currently 
the case. However, observations that become lessons learned must find the end-user 
quickly. No central authority presides over high-threat incident learning, nor does any 
entity actively curate such material. The fly team, while innovative, proved the concept of 
rapid data acquisition and analysis but did not address the ideal dissemination of the 
information.  
Channel concerns remain outside the scope of the experiment because the original 
intent concerned sharing the data internally. The government after-action reports were 
distributed via the media and various websites. This channel represents a “push” rather 
than a “pull” mentality for the dissemination of the incident review. For instances in which 
agencies encounter an unsolved problem or intractable issue, a mechanism to pull learning 
from another agency or initiate a learning process would be helpful. This approach would 
be analogous to pulling information and complementary to the push of an AAR, for 
example. Likewise, agencies cannot measure the degree to which an AAR has reached 
stakeholders. Optimizing organizational learning data is discussed in Chapter V but is a 
rich area for future research.  
As demonstrated in the next chapter, a U.S. Army organization named the Center 
for Army Lessons Learned captures real-time data. Unless a research team like the HTI 
becomes embedded with an emergency services organization for a previously scheduled 
event, such as an exercise or training, real-time data capture is highly unlikely for the HSE. 
However, examples provided in Chapter II make the argument that near real-time data 
capture, from one to five days following a significant event, is good enough and can 
supplement more formal learning processes. 
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III. CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED 
Discovery is seeing what everybody else has seen and thinking what nobody 
else has thought.  
 —Albert Szent-Györgyi 
Organizations need to curate lessons learned and organizational successes, and the 
U.S. Army has invested in a structure to do so. In this vein, the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL)—which has operated since 1985 in the Department of the Army’s 
Training and Doctrine Command—focuses on organizational learning.134 Indeed, having 
experience in both creating lessons learned from training scenarios and observing troops 
in deployment—“learning in action”—CALL maintains organizational learning processes 
in multiple methods for the Army.  
Accordingly, successful knowledge management results in “improved decision-
making, increased productivity, sharing best practices, less need to reinvent, and improved 
staff development,” all of which are important to a military or an organization.135 As with 
many facets of organizational growth, continuous improvement has occurred over many 
decades, with catalysts along the way. CALL has become an award-winning government 
institution responsible for learning among the broader community it serves.136 More 
importantly, learning is an active, well-structured process that ultimately translates into 
doctrinal evolution for the Army. CALL can shed much-needed light on the organizational 
learning process to guide civilian efforts in this arena.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Army formally created CALL in 1985 “as a unit for collecting new lessons 
as they emerged from army operations, either in a live situation . . . or during 
                                               
134 The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command was established in 1973 and incorporated four 
combat training centers to prepare troops for war and develop operational leaders.  
135 Chua and Wing, “Center for Army Lessons Learned,” 69. 
136 In 1996, CALL’s database won the Hammer Award and received accolades toward the Computer 
World Smithsonian Award. The Hammer Award recognized innovative technological infrastructure that 
supported President Clinton’s National Performance Review, specifically for a more efficient government. 
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simulations.”137 However, its roots precede 1985. The Army began the tradition of rapidly 
disseminating battlefield lessons learned during World War II by printing a newsletter for 
field personnel discussing pertinent current issues. These daily accounts served the purpose 
of “enabl[ing] units . . . to profit from the latest combat experiences of our troops . . . 
fighting the Germans.”138 Given the harsh realities of war, and the cost of lessons learned 
in physical injury and death, the military needs to retain and distribute those lessons across 
the organization, both at the time learned and in similar future situations. Mains and Ariely 
argue that formal lessons-learned pathways were less successful during Vietnam; however, 
errors during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 led to the formal establishment of 
CALL to address these concerns.139 Initial efforts lacked real-time data collection and 
dissemination and focused on lessons from units training at the National Training Center. 
The high-tempo period of the first Gulf War motivated a transition to collect lessons 
learned actively from deployed field units. 
The scope of CALL’s activities increased after the Gulf War as the Army began to 
leverage technology in additional capacities to augment training. These additional 
technologies included “virtual reality, digitization, and sophisticated simulation.”140 
CALL’s involvement has supplemented the Army’s intent to link performance in training 
with future capability and officer development but also drive decision making for current 
operations based on the outcome of simulation-based training. 
B. PROCESS 
CALL inculcates a multistep learning process with four overarching objectives. 
First, it locates gaps in knowledge or areas that need to be explored further to meet the 
Army’s needs. Second, it follows a rigorously prescribed method of data collection; it then 
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transforms that information into intelligence: a finished product that can be used to change 
an action or behavior or optimize a current process (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Call Process141 
The final step of the process involves the transmission of new knowledge into the 
field. As stated above, CALL deploys direct observation teams to accomplish its mission 
in real time and “insights obtained from the field are interpreted from multiple sources and 
disseminated as lessons learned in various forms such as written reports, videos, or training 
simulations.”142 This process generates new tacit knowledge for the community, which is 
the most difficult knowledge to describe as it involves interpretation and sensemaking to 
draw conclusions and inference.143 The CALL approach undoubtedly represents an 
optimized method for continuous organizational learning. 
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With CALL’s vast institutional memory, knowledge creation comes in many forms 
and depends only on the needs of the organization. Local customs, cultural indoctrination, 
or deployment health concerns represent the more explicit type of needed knowledge 
disseminated throughout the organization for mission success. On the other end of the 
spectrum, tacit knowledge, such as adjustment to tactics or core doctrine, can occur with 
its knowledge management process. Importantly, however, CALL now ties “specific 
learning objectives” to data collection because, by not focusing on this previously,  
[the] approach resulted in an avalanche of raw data that overloaded the 
army’s capacity to turn it into useful lessons for future engagements. CALL 
recognized this pitfall and has since developed a framework to select an 
event for observation that has high potential for generating knowledge with 
future strategic value.144 
Notably, CALL’s process discriminates what to study and how to study it. 
1. AAR 
CALL has optimized the AAR as a major tool for the Army over many years. 
Although an intricate process, as described by Morrison, it uses four principal questions: 
What was expected to happen during the engagement? What transpired? Considering both 
of the aforementioned, what new concepts emerged? And how do these concepts relate to 
ongoing and future engagements for the army?145 
CALL indoctrinates personnel before they deploy as the learning team. The center 
brings the team to headquarters, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to learn how to 
collect field data related to the problem sets being studied. This process can take up to two 
months to learn but “helps to keep each collector focused on critical information 
requirements and provides a structure to organize the myriad of details collected.”146 This 
structure facilitates a repeatable process. 
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Collectors are not failure-seekers, looking for divergence from established policy 
or doctrine, and they “are not sent with ground troops in the field to deliberately look for 
failures and mistakes. Rather, they are there to understand current events and enable the 
Army to be better prepared for the future.”147 As everyone feels an aversion toward failure, 
establishing the purpose is important. Making the system better—the explicit goal of the 
research process—differs from seeking information for disciplinary purposes for rule-
breaking. When framed this way, people more willingly provide information that optimizes 
future operations. Ultimately in the military setting, perfecting a tactic could mean the 
difference between life and death, so this makes sense as a motivation. 
2. Richness of Data 
CALL seeks to provide a vivid account of the ground conditions in conflict. Alton 
refers to the “richness” of the data multiple times in reference to “belligerent crowds, 
barking dogs, and rotting garbage.”148 Why? Because by providing this level of accuracy, 
those interpreting the tacit knowledge can hypothesize and be in the moment. This richness 
could lead to a level of abstraction that creates new meaning or tacit knowledge. Contextual 
details are important and, as such, relate directly to knowledge creation and transfer. 
However, the shiny object dilemma accompanies richness. If not prevented by training, the 
collector might focus on outliers. If, for example, a radio fails to work, it would be an 
ordinary event. CALL could, however, generalize the radio failure as a deficiency outside 
the immediate area of operation. CALL has a remedy for this challenge, as “collectors try 
to focus on identifying systemic problems rather than those due to temporary anomalies. 
. . . They seek to trace the path of the problem back to its source to gain a rich understanding 
of what happened and why, collecting evidence along the way.”149 Early examples of this 
in CALL’s history came from the Bosnia experience. For instance, troops received 
warnings about roads covered with snow and bearing no visible track marks, which 
suggested the presence of minefields buried by the adversary, and a procedure required 
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trucks caught in minefields to back out rather than execute turns to escape.150 This 
foreknowledge saved lives. 
3. Dissemination 
Even in an optimized learning process, if the new knowledge does not reach the 
end-user, its creation is pointless. As Mark Nissen has written regarding stocks and flows 
of knowledge, knowledge “needs to be applied—not just created or possessed—in order 
for a firm to extract value and to offset opportunity costs.”151 CALL transmits knowledge 
via multiple dissemination pathways. Media can range from written materials that 
emphasize a specific purpose, such as leadership under emergent circumstances, maneuver 
warfare adjustments, or visual aids such as training videos. In one case, CALL developed 
multiple training video modules to pass on knowledge from one deployed force to the next. 
CALL uses both an open and secure database depending on the lesson and the 
intended audience. For example, with a civilian or academic audience, CALL uses the open 
database approved for unlimited distribution; likewise, with an audience internal to the 
Army or with appropriate clearance, CALL uses the restricted site. CALL has created a 
number of indexing and searching tools that optimize the search process for the end-user, 
which contributes to knowledge conversion and decreases organizational friction for both 
knowledge stocks and flows.152 And just like the multi-disciplinary effort of the collection 
team, a multi-disciplinary set of curators and technologists supports the process by storing 
materials in a database. Specifically,  
CALL has invested in RetrievalWare, an enterprise search ad categorization 
solution that allows users to sort . . . [t]o ease searching the CALL database 
uses two indexing schemes. The first is a structural indexing based on 
keywords, attributes of the learning events such as time, place, and date, as 
well as an army-wide coding scheme of conditions, tasks, and standards. 
The second is a process-based index scheme based on the organizational 
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processes and functions mapped in the “Blueprint of the Battlefield used in 
the army.”153  
End products are released in multiple formats including guides, newsletters, training 
documents, and doctrinal adjustments. 
4. Organization 
CALL organizes data collection into teams for in-field learning. The team collects 
observations and sends them back daily for analysis by a nondeployed group called 
analysts. The data sent back could be from multiple teams and multiple locations, 
representing information collected in real time and freshly transmitted via electronic 
means. Physical media that support the observations made are transmitted via mail. To 
reduce the risk of entering bias into the process, the observation and analyst teams do not 
collaborate; however, the collection team collaborates “online on a daily basis to discuss 
emerging insights into the war to share feedback.”154 The analysts then leverage the Army’s 
network of SMEs, who may or may not be associated with CALL, to create tacit knowledge 
from the raw data. Gaining situational awareness, the operation—as it is applied against 
the standing conditions on the ground and the data interpreted for new discovery—becomes 
a sensemaking process. 
Specifically, CALL provides sensemaking in a group process close to the event that 
contributes to another learning attribute of shared meaning. As Weick explains, “If people 
want to share meaning, then they need to talk about their shared experience in close 
proximity to its occurrence and hammer out a common way to encode it and talk about 
it.”155 Analysts prepare the observations in a standardized format before sending them out 
for review. A regimented format not only ensures consistency but allows for tracking of all 
observations. CALL leverages the world wide web, distribution lists, and electronic 
communities of interest to share the material and solicit feedback to cast a wide net for 
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general issues and a targeted channel for specific circumstances that require a focused 
viewpoint. The analyst must keep the sensemaking iterative and “open and redirect issues 
to other participants.”156 The analyst referees and moderates as knowledge is being 
explored or created. 
Tacit knowledge creation, or the knowledge that cannot be easily seen or described, 
according to Nonaka, plays a critical role in CALL’s success.157 Analysts use conversations 
with SMEs to draw new inferences between the data and operational context to derive 
lessons for future operations. As the data prompts new questions from the analysts, requests 
for additional information reroute to the collection team. This push–pull relationship 
effectively creates a two-way roadmap for knowledge conversion. Once enough knowledge 
has resulted in multiple lessons, collectors are removed from the field to finally meet and 
pair with the analysts assigned to review and rank the data. Releasing too many lessons at 
one time could create information overload, so CALL analysts deliberate about which 
lessons are most likely to yield the greatest operational impact. 
C. CASE STUDY: HAITI 
During the period of 1991–1994, Haiti saw severe unrest, catalyzed by a military 
coup that overthrew elected leadership. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide narrowly avoided 
death, and the military exiled him to France while presiding over the county. Years of 
oppression and human rights abuses ensued. The broader international community applied 
pressure and economic sanctions to force behavioral change in the regime, yet these efforts 
ultimately failed to achieve the desired goals. In July 1994, the United Nations authorized 
Security Resolution 940, which approved the use of a U.S.-led military force to restore 
President Aristide and democracy writ large. This operation was called Operation Uphold 
Democracy. 
Faced with the threat of overwhelming military force, a peaceful transition of power 
took place in 1994–1995 without significant military operations. However, Operation 
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Uphold Democracy still required a large U.S. Army presence for peacekeeping and nation-
rebuilding efforts. U.S.-led efforts ended on March 31,1995, at which time the operation 
transitioned to a United Nations peacekeeping force. While the entire operation was still 
ongoing, CALL embedded learning teams. Ultimately, the Army attributed the seamless 
transition of forces to the real-time knowledge transferred. 
1. The Learning Effort 
A significant learning opportunity presented itself in the Haiti conflict. CALL had 
previously generated real-time learning efforts in both Somalia and Rwanda and 
understood the opportunity when it became clear that troops would be deployed to Haiti.158 
For instance, true lessons learned from these past experiences included the “importance of 
and procedures for water purification, deployment procedures for peacekeeping operations, 
improvements in the coordination of logistics, and the integration across armed 
services.”159 All these lessons were “consolidated and introduced into training prior to 
deployment and to the documentation soldiers took into Haiti.”160 This example illustrates 
previous on-the-ground learning that influenced and helped optimize ongoing operations. 
It also demonstrates successful knowledge transfer of past practices. Thus, CALL quite 
literally identified “ground truths” in Haiti that became embedded in the training and 
doctrine cycle for the next wave of troops deploying. 
The first major changeover of units featured the best example of knowledge transfer 
into operations. As the first force to deploy, the 10th Mountain Division had already 
embedded with CALL. Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division (Schofield Barracks, 
Hawaii) had been set to replace the 10th Mountain; accordingly, CALL created 26 
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scenarios from its lessons learned to train the 25th soldiers prior to deployment. This 
incredible learning opportunity represents one of the major successes of the entire 
operation. Baird, Henderson, and Watts confirm CALL’s success:  
The 26 scenarios included situations faced by the first troops in and 
suggested best solutions, complete with video footage of the actual events, 
virtual simulations, and scripted responses. . . . [L]anding in Haiti by troops 
from Schofield was like landing on familiar ground. . . . During six months 
in Haiti they actually faced 23 of the 26 scenarios on which they trained. 
Commanders gave credit to CALL and their “just-in-time” learning 
capability for the smoothness of the operation. The troops knew what they 
would likely face and how to react.161  
The approach demonstrated phenomenal success in both learning and the distillation of 
knowledge to the solider. 
2. Real-Time Learning 
In Haiti, CALL wrote over 100 scenarios and smaller instructive teachings, 
prepared remote learning for deployed troops to train with, and developed simulations for 
the incoming replacement personnel. It also produced documents that “helped clarify how 
the army should work with non-army organizations such as the local government, Haitian 
police, and multinational forces.”162 Deployed forces attribute success to the targeted 
learning prior to deployment. When a journalist asked for a candid assessment of why the 
deployment was successful, one soldier said, “Because I have already walked down this 
street 20 times before.”163 This quote testifies to the value of real-time learning for doctrinal 
shifts of large organizations, and the role new knowledge plays in the evolution of tactics 
in time-sensitive settings. 
These examples show the need and benefit of continuous strategic learning. More 
specifically, learning became a priority within the deployed units and was adopted 
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throughout all levels of the organization. Benefits also became readily apparent on the 
ground, as the situation evolved, and so did the tactics employed. After the transition from 
dictatorial rule, peacekeeping operations regularly searched for stored weapons caches 
from sympathizers and interviewed the population to gain intelligence on rebel locations. 
The U.S. Army frequently used the AAR process to assess activities and make operational 
adjustments. During the first period of operations, an AAR suggested that large-breed dogs, 
such as German shepherds, commonly used by military police, intimidated the Haitians. 
Up to that point, Haitians had been extremely uncooperative with peacekeeping forces.164 
The AAR process captured three data points. The first was the reaction to the dogs; second, 
native dogs did not exist in theater, which could complicate the operation involving 
military dogs; and third, dogs should be placed at the front of the patrol, increasing their 
presence and projecting early power. The troops patrolling changed their use of dogs in the 
next outing, which yielded greater success.  
A second AAR observation in real time helped troops become even more 
successful. During initial efforts, villages had few Haitian women, and the men of the 
towns often became agitated and difficult. Some suggested a female commander take 
command of the unit and interact with the townspeople. The largely male unit purposely 
and visibly deferred to the new female commander, and each member saluted her as the 
unit strode into the next village, which differed from the cultural norm in-situ and further 
decreased aggressive encounters. Modifying tactics lowered hostilities and relieved tension 
in occupying villages. 
Finally, an AAR noted that villagers became extremely hostile when encountered 
on the street but much calmer when greeted in their homes. The commander moved 
conversations over local issues into people’s homes. The addition of large-breed dogs, a 
female commander, and a tactics adjustment in real time “worked superbly; guns and 
ammunition were found and quickly removed.”165 These outcomes suggest that the 
investment in real or near real-time data collection pays handsome rewards. 
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D. DISCUSSION 
CALL demonstrably succeeds as a strategic learning organization that produces 
“knowledge asymmetries that can lead to differences in organizational performance.”166 
CALL’s framework for learning translates multiple sources of data into timely, meaningful 
outputs for end-users, and optimizes how practitioners receive those products. Notably, 
CALL also uses lessons learned to their fullest extent by then initiating doctrinal change 
with the new information. Distilling knowledge permeates all aspects of the organization 
once doctrinal change occurs, including future training, officer development, and 
operations of currently deployed forces. 
1. Timeliness 
In these case studies, CALL accomplished regular lessons observed, as well as 
those learned in an extremely short period. A situation identified as a learning opportunity 
before deployment may take only two to eight weeks. Once CALL is embedded, collecting 
begins immediately for consumption by the analysis crew. In contrast, civilian emergency 
services take a protracted time to gather and publish lessons learned or an after-action 
review document. CALL’s strength lies in its repeatable framework for deployment in a 
compressed timeframe. If innovation in doctrine or tactics occurs with this established 
process in the military, external validity exists for police, fire, EMS, and emergency 
management. 
2. Sensemaking 
The CALL process makes sense for deployed units in both combat and training. 
Sensemaking uses many factors and has been shown, specifically for CALL, to include an 
informed collection team very close to the incident, deployment, or training, and a coterie 
of SMEs who dissect observations. The team analyzes these observations for relevance, 
cross-references them against other SMEs who are not in the CALL network, and 
prioritizes them for the most significant organizational learning opportunities. CALL then 
efficiently disseminates these lessons learned. 
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Sensemaking in CALL’s case extends far beyond just reporting relevant facts. 
Since the analysts not only assess performance against a baseline but also question 
underlying assumptions, this scope suggests both single- and double-loop learning. As 
Weick describes, “Sensemaking is about such things as placement of items into 
frameworks, comprehending, redressing surprise, constructing meaning, interacting in 
pursuit of mutual understanding, and patterning.”167 Sensemaking is especially useful 
when comparing CALL’s process to current emergency services’ AARs. Not only do they 
lack timeliness, but they often rely on SMEs internal to the organization and lack the 
objectivity of analysts unaffiliated with the organization. Also, the current AAR process 
lacks sufficient evidence of challenging underlying assumptions that would transform it 
into double-loop learning. 
CALL also exhibits quick sensemaking because it is already embedded with units 
experiencing problems, and as Weick articulates, “in real-world practice, problems do not 
present themselves to the practitioners as givens. They [problems] must be constructed 
from the materials of . . . situations that are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain.”168 Having 
a pre-established framework to present the problem set and the means by which to evaluate 
it presents an advantage not currently possessed by the HSE. 
3. Dissemination 
After sensemaking, lessons learned must be transmitted. Individual or 
organizational learning cannot be generalized without a doctrine and structure to 
disseminate lessons learned. CALL uses multiple channels for distributing information. 
Individual users search both the open-source and restricted site for information. Individuals 
initiate this learning and research, and the learning depends on individual motivation. 
CALL’s responses to custom questions from the field regarding ongoing operations 
represent another channel. CALL personnel email the field user in as little as a few hours 
or at most a few days. The third pathway distributes “mass-market” materials “intended for 
a wide audience and are published in the form of handbooks, newsletters and training 
                                               
167 Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, 6. 
168 Weick, 9. 
64 
materials or incorporated into army doctrine.”169 Its first and most prominent channel 
broadcasts the official after-action reports. The CALL website posts these reports with 
restricted access for authorized users. This website serves as a single point of reference, 
doctrinally approved, to look for lessons learned. 
Interestingly, CALL uses a “push and pull” approach in the dissemination of 
knowledge.170 Given the disjointed nature of the federal emergency response system in the 
United States, many entities have knowledge repositories of after-action reviews from 
various incidents. No one established entity can easily manage a repository of lessons 
learned. Previous efforts, such as the Lesson Learned Information System, archived 
documents with lessons learned in one location, but the Department of Homeland Security 
defunded it.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The sensemaking organization, CALL, demonstrates that rapid learning is possible 
in highly complex and violent environments. Decades of real-time deployment embedded 
in combat operations have polished its processes and framework, which can be used as a 
model. Its data collection often produces “rich accounts” from the field but separates the 
analysis from such data collection to limit bias. Although not designed to be a reactive 
learning team because of its embedded nature, CALL still suggests a framework for 
effective organizational learning that could provide a better method for paramilitary 
organizational learning.  
The CALL process does, however, suggest the HSE has a long way to go—
specifically in gathering, assessing, and disseminating pertinent information from high-
threat events in real time to optimize learning. It also suggests the significant opportunity 
costs incurred when agencies that face high-threat problems lack a structured, systemic 
organizational learning mechanism to answer unresolved response questions. If the HSE is 
slow to learn and ineffective in its knowledge transfer processes, thinking adversaries could 
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benefit from these identified shortcomings. The following chapter evaluates a near real-
time learning team that responds only after a tragic event has occurred to investigate its 
applicability for better learning in the HSE. 
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IV. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better. 
 —Samuel Beckett 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a legislatively mandated 
governmental agency with absolute independence but no regulatory authority. It 
investigates significant accidents and incidents for the transportation community, 
employing a near real-time learning team to assess ground conditions and event 
information as soon as possible after an accident. The NTSB has established a strict process 
for this learning team that may apply to other incidents requiring fast knowledge or quick 
learning for a broader community. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The National Transportation Safety Board’s genesis lies in the Air Commerce Act 
of 1926, whose purpose was “to encourage and regulate the use of aircraft for commerce, 
and other purposes.”171 The word “safety” appears only four times in the original document 
and relates to the need to provide weather and other meteorological reports for flight 
operations and to inspect aircraft. In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act created a Civil 
Aeronautics Authority to focus on “air traffic control, safety programs, and airway 
development.”172 Congress created the Department of Transportation in 1967, which 
housed an independent organization focused on safety, and in 1974 moved the NTSB out 
from under the Department of Transportation as a stand-alone agency with full autonomy. 
Such independence allowed for full investigative authority, free from any perceived or real 
political influence. As an independent investigatory agency, a presidentially appointed, 
Senate-confirmed five-person board that serves a five-year term leads the NTSB and issues 
investigative reports. The legislative mandate extends not only to the investigation of every 
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aircraft accident but also to “significant” accidents related to road, pipeline, rail, or water 
incidents.  
Accordingly, it has investigated over 149,000 air events and thousands of road and 
waterway accidents, resulting in over 15,000 recommendations since its inception.173 
These recommendations are voluntary as the NTSB carries no regulatory authority; 
however, industry compliance with NTSB recommendations is estimated to be 
approximately 82 percent and, therefore, should be heralded as a successful motivator to 
change industry practice or behavior after an event.174 The NTSB also plays a significant 
role in the initial coordination of federal family assistance resources for persons involved 
in significant transportation accidents.  
B. PROCESS 
The NTSB has two defined roles: investigating transportation accidents and 
incidents. In the case of an incident, the event itself may or may not result in property 
damage, injury, or death.175 The Federal Aviation Administration defines an accident as 
“an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft . . . and [an occurrence] in which 
any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial 
damage.”176 This definition implies the opportunity for many hundreds of investigations in 
any given year.177 
Investigations have five distinct categories: major investigation (full team), major 
investigation (regional office), field investigation, limited investigation, and delegated 
investigation. This research explores only the major full-team investigatory processes to 
analyze and interpret the organizational learning process and knowledge transfer. 
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Likewise, the desire to focus on the NTSB’s Go Team, the entity responsible for initial 
data collection, further supports this limited scope.  
The NTSB implements a five-step process for investigating transportation-related 
accidents. First, it deploys a data collection team to the incident site, releases a timely initial 
preliminary report, conducts an investigative hearing if needed, holds an NTSB meeting, 
and then issues a final report. The process begins as soon as possible after an event and can 
take two to three years for a final report.178 The NTSB produces a preliminary report 
regarding the incident within several weeks, making it public for general situational 
awareness. A recent example included a helicopter crash in Calabasas, California, in 
January 2020, when a Hall of Fame basketball player and eight other souls tragically 
perished. The crash occurred on January 26, 2020, and the NTSB released the preliminary 
report on February 7, 2020—demonstrating the speed with which preliminary reports can 
be published.  
1. Data Collection 
The NTSB Go Team is a multi-disciplinary group of SMEs on call for deployment 
within a few hours of notification. It organizes initial data collection efforts for major 
investigations. The groups within the Go Team specialize in particular areas depending on 
the accident but could include operations, human factors, air traffic control, powerplants, 
maintenance, survival factors, flight recorders, weather, structure systems, airports, aircraft 
performance, and materials laboratories.179 The team maintains a roster and communicates 
with NTSB headquarters in Washington, DC, for rapid deployment to the accident site. 
The team members often maintain readiness with luggage prepared with personal items, 
clothes, and other effects needed for an extended deployment. The NTSB office also ships 
pre-packed office materials, otherwise known as the “fly-away suitcases” to the team 
assembly area upon notification of a deployment.180 Throughout all of its initial 
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deployment organizational processes, speed is considered a critical component to capturing 
data that eventually lead to organizational learning. 
Notification of the event can come several ways, from media monitoring by the 
NTSB operations center or via foreign partners, air traffic control, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, or the aircraft operator. The inspector-in-charge (IIC)—who is federally 
designated but not often the first to arrive at the incident site—leads the NTSB Go Team. 
The NTSB representative who arrives first, perhaps from a regional office closer to the 
crash site, conducts a “stake-down” of the incident site.181 To the NTSB, a stake-down 
connotes a brief physical review of the incident site and the initial effort to preserve the 
scene. This process also establishes the NTSB’s jurisdiction at the crash site. A final 
component to this initial process is assessing safety conditions for the team before starting 
the investigation. The perishability of evidence for the NTSB is often a concern. With 
non–aircraft related accidents, such as rail or roadway, the public often exerts pressure to 
reopen the transportation pathway once the clean-up is complete. Generally, aircraft-
related accidents do not suffer from this issue, given the magnitude and severity of the 
event. 
2. Organization 
The Response Operations Center at the NTSB handles the deployment of the Go 
Team to the incident site. The operations center arranges logistics to get the team in place 
including flights, hotel bookings, meeting space, and other travel details. Having someone 
outside the investigations team handle logistical details allows the team to prepare for the 
review of the scene without distraction. Once on scene, the team is divided into small 
groups, referred to as the “party process,” within the overall organizational structure. Each 
party to the investigation has a specific area of responsibility and abides by the disclosure 
rules. Parties swear themselves in and sign the party agreement at the initial meeting that 
governs information disclosure exclusively through official NTSB mechanisms. No party 
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individual may communicate, as this is a stipulation of the agreement. Any violation of the 
party agreement can result in the Go Team being dismissed. 
At an initial meeting on scene, the Go Team organizes itself at a distance from the 
family assistance location and the incident site. This setup delineates each function and 
prevents spillover of information. During the investigation, daily meetings to share 
information and discuss progress happen. Each group presents the information collected 
from the preceding day, and teams discuss what work still needs to be accomplished. 
Multiple briefings happen each day including separate ones for families and the media. 
Another multi-disciplinary team that operates within the Go Team structure is the 
transportation disaster assistance group, which was established in the Aviation Disaster 
Assistance Act. This group may comprise response personnel, social workers, forensic 
anthropologists, mental health professionals, and aviation representatives, all of whom help 
coordinate the recovery of deceased passengers for family members. The involved carrier 
and the group work collaboratively to establish the family assistance center, which is 
located separately from the Go Team’s base of operations. 
The first few hours of a Go Team deployment involve traveling to the incident 
location and the initial stake-down. The working group chairs usually attempt a site walk-
through if safe to do so as well as coordinate with first responders. If applicable, toxicology 
tests will be requested and drawn, and the Go Team will have a full organizational meeting 
to discuss all pertinent preliminary information, obtain an official briefing by first 
responders, discuss fatalities and injuries, review ground rules, sign the party declaration, 
and ensure all applicable groups and personnel have been assigned.182 The Go Team also 
consists of other support functions to support the data collection effort. These groups 
routinely encompass a liaison with first responders, governmental affairs to interact with 
local and state officials, public relations to handle all media concerns, logistics, information 
technology support, and general counsel, if legal guidance is needed to support efforts in 
obtaining subpoenas. 
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Go Team deployments do not have strict deadlines for data collection, but efforts 
generally take between one and three weeks.183 The amount of time required to collect all 
information needed on the ground is not pre-determined and remains at the discretion of 
the IIC. The IIC guides the process because “data” in a transportation-related accident or 
investigation is perishable. All team members take notes throughout the collection process 
and sign their field notes at the end of the effort. But the IIC is the only person who 
authorizes a team member to clear the investigation site upon completion of the data 
collection. Potentially, a few actions happen after the Go Team has left the site that cannot 
feasibly be performed with team members there. Full site exploitation requires close 
coordination and good initial evidence preservation during the stake-down process. Engine 
or component disassembly, follow-up interviews, simulator and materials analysis, or a 
review of maintenance records may occur after the initial deployment. After a Go Team 
deployment, the NTSB transitions into its second phase, which consists of drafting the 
preliminary report. 
3. Preliminary Report 
With all the data assembled after the deployment of the Go Team, the preliminary 
report becomes part of the official record. Within several weeks of the event, the draft 
report is released. Broadly, this step summarizes the field notes from the Go Team. 
Information such as which investigation groups deployed to the scene, weather information 
at the time of the incident, airframe ownership, an exemplar of an undamaged similar 
airframe, injury or fatality information, air traffic control, and physical location of 
wreckage are all reported. This initial report states facts regarding objective indicators and 
does not attribute fault, thus reserving incident-specific information for dissemination to 
the broader community until after verification by SMEs. 
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Figure 4. The NTSB Process184 
4. Investigative Hearing  
Next in the process is the investigative hearing. The Sunshine in the Government 
Act dictates that the hearing be open to the public. According to Berg, the Act “is based on 
the policy that ‘the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the 
decision-making processes of the Federal government.’”185 The public hearing serves to 
gain additional information needed to support the investigation or to make 
recommendations regarding safety concerns. It can include testimony by witnesses either 
                                               
184 Source: National Disaster Medical System, DMORT Standard Operating Procedures for National 
Transportation Safety Board Activities (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2006), 9, 
https://nsri.nebraska.edu/-/media/nsri/documents/ndms2020/dmort-ntsb-sop-nov-2006.pdf. 
185 Richard K. Berg and Stephen H. Klitzman, An Interpretive Guide to the Government in the 
Sunshine Act (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), xiii, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
mdp.39015013513950. 
74 
by consent or under deposition. The five-member NTSB board chairs the investigative 
hearing held at NTSB headquarters in Washington, DC. Depending on the nature of the 
accident or investigation and the politicization of the event, these hearings can be highly 
publicized in the media. 
5. Board Meeting  
The penultimate step in the process is the NTSB board meeting, which determines 
probable cause and at which the board votes on recommendations based on the totality of 
the data. For accountability, this hearing takes place in a public forum. Ultimately, the 
findings and conclusions appear before the board for adjudication. Adjudication may 
involve adopting the entire draft report, instituting revisions to the report, requesting further 
investigation, or finalizing the report with updates considered during the open board 
meeting.186 All of the previous data collection, deliberation, and sensemaking are now 
prepared as a product intended for learning and industry change. 
6. Final Report 
The NTSB then issues a final report and disseminates it via its website. The report 
generally contains four sections that cover the factual events of the incident, the analysis 
of the data collected, the conclusion of the NTSB board, and subsequent safety 
recommendations to be employed. While the NTSB has no regulatory power over 
compliance, the data suggest that compliance is generally adopted by industry.187 When 
the NTSB makes a recommendation, it identifies the party responsible for the 
recommendation, clearly describes the rectifying measures, and identifies the overall safety 
measure that the action will meet. 
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C. CASE STUDY: MOTOR VESSEL CONCEPTION 
The Motor Vessel (MV) Conception was involved in one of the deadliest maritime 
accidents in modern history.188 Thirty-three passengers and one crew member perished in 
a large shipboard fire. This tragic incident serves as a case study to demonstrate the 
attributes of the Go Team: fast learning and knowledge transmission, both within and 
outside the initial community of interest. 
In the early morning hours of September 2, 2019, the MV Conception was 
beginning its third and final day of a charter scuba diving trip off the coast of Santa Cruz, 
California. The boat had a crew of six on board with 33 divers. At 3:14 a.m., the United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) received a distress call indicating a fire on the 75-foot vessel. 
The fire quickly engulfed the boat and spread to the cabin area where the stairs to the lower 
deck housing the berths were located. The crew, according to the NTSB, “attempted to 
access the salon and passengers below. Unable to use the aft ladder, which was on fire, the 
crewmembers jumped down to the main deck (one crewmember broke his leg in the 
process) and tried to access the salon and galley compartment, which was fully engulfed 
by fire.”189  
All the passengers and one crew member, who were sleeping below, perished. The 
above-deck crew jumped to safety to the water after radioing the emergency and continued 
to attempt rescue efforts, which were futile. The USCG then named the incident a major 
accident, which designated the NTSB the lead agency. Parties for this incident included the 
NTSB Go Team, Santa Barbara Sherriff’s Office, Santa Barbara Fire Department, USCG, 
and Truth Aquatics, Inc., the vessel’s owner. 
Between September 3 and September 11, the NTSB Go Team conducted its field 
investigation of the incident. On September 12, 2019, the NTSB published the preliminary 
accident report outlining the key facts of the case but reserved probable cause. On 
September 10, 2019, two days before the release of the preliminary NTSB report, the 
USCG published the Marine Safety Information Bulletin No. 008-19, entitled “Passenger 
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Vessel Compliance and Operational Readiness.” This bulletin “identifies regulations 
related to firefighting, lifesaving, preparations for emergencies, and means of escape that 
serve as a reminder for owners and operators to ensure the safety of the passengers and 
crew while onboard.”190 Among other requirements, the bulletin reminds operators to 
check emergency equipment and procedures, review the sleeping areas for passenger 
guests in relation to hazards present, and most importantly, “reduce potential fire hazards 
and consider limiting the unsupervised charging of lithium-ion batteries and extensive use 
of power strips and extension cords.”191 This first mention of the potential cause of the 
deadly fire was absent in the NTSB release two days later. Saving the cause determination 
until the final report is consistent with the NTSB’s procedure. 
The arrangement between the USCG and the NTSB is established in 49 C.F.R. 
§ 831.55. It stipulates, “The NTSB conducts marine casualty and major marine casualty 
investigations. . . . [T]he NTSB and USCG work together to collect evidence related to 
marine casualties and major marine causalities,” and furthermore, the NTSB 
“independently analyzes the evidence and determines the probable cause of marine 
casualties and major marine causalities.”192 Under this mandate, the USCG leverages the 
investigatory power of the Go Team when maritime accidents occur. To that end, the 
maritime industry had an initial safety bulletin, factually based, issued by the USCG eight 
days after the occurrence of the fire and an NTSB account two days after that. Although 
both the bulletin and the report were preliminary, they provided a common situational 
assessment for all entities across the United States. Although the NTSB report provided an 
accurate account of the events and avoided determining a cause until the final report was 
released, the USCG report provided some initial sensemaking by offering specific safety 
steps to review, such as the warning against charging batteries. 
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The discussion of the NTSB case focuses on three similar factors evaluated for both 
the 1 October exemplars and CALL. Timeliness, sensemaking, and the efficient 
dissemination of knowledge are all critical factors that contribute to organizational 
learning. 
1. Timeliness 
The speed of a deployment for a significant accident or investigation is crucial. The 
NTSB Go Team process institutionalizes the ability to muster a technically qualified team 
to contribute to organizational learning from a tragic incident. In this instance, capturing 
information as quickly as possible is vital, given the perishable nature of evidence and the 
fleeting nature of memory. As Lebow et al. state, “The field notes are the only official 
representation of conditions immediately following an accident. They are very important 
because a witness’s memory of events can change with time and the wreckage itself can be 
altered shortly after the on-scene phase of the investigation is completed.”193 As is 
described in the NTSB’s Go Team description, the logistics of putting an entire team on 
the ground with no notice requires significant planning and operational effort. 
The Go Team being deployed has the responsibility of collecting data. This process 
is established in the major team’s Investigation Manual of the NTSB.194 The Operations 
Center handles common issues such as the identification of a base of operations for the 
team, lodging and flights if needed, and transportation. Having a non-deployed employee 
handle team needs frees the team, especially the IIC, to concentrate on assembling the 
appropriate team for the incident and focusing on the best plan for the exploitation of the 
site. It also allows for a full-time operations assistant who is remote from the site for near 
real-time incident support. Having a pre-established policy regarding the party process, 
delineation of duties, and the authority of the IIC allows the team to hit the ground and be 
efficient in executing its investigatory responsibilities. 
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Comparatively, not many no-notice teams exist in the homeland security 
environment. FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, the FBI’s Fly Team, and 
the NTSB are three examples among tens of thousands of operational response units 
responsible for near real-time organizational learning and knowledge management. In the 
case of USAR teams, learning is only a by-product of operational response, as the primary 
function of these teams is to provide rescue and medical services to areas hard hit by natural 
or manmade disasters. The FBI’s teams perform mandated investigations rather than 
optimize emergency response.195 No real-time learning team exists to optimize the 
response of first responders. 
2. Sensemaking 
Sensemaking implies making order from the unknown. The NTSB Go Team 
process aims to combat disorder quickly. In the example given, experts across the United 
States collaborate with multiple agencies and disciplines to produce a factual report in nine 
days. Specific to the MV Conception case, Go Team members had to access a 
geographically difficult area, analyze evidence that was mostly submerged underwater, and 
produce a meaningful report in accordance with their agency’s charter.196 This 
sensemaking becomes less difficult when all parties expect the investigation. The Go 
Team, armed with legislation, does not have competing priorities of gaining access to those 
with the information and simultaneously conducting the investigation. Because all 
involved understand the need and role of the NTSB, the Go Team can deploy and go to 
work. 
External validity is important to the discussion of near real-time learning because, 
according to Leighton,  
external validity can be generalized to a broader group of individuals than 
those originally included in the study. External validity is relevant to the 
topic of research methods because scientific and scholarly investigations are 
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normally conducted with interest in generalizing findings to a larger 
population of individuals so that the findings can be of benefit to many and 
not just a few.197  
Sensemaking infuses the NTSB Go Team’s process since SMEs within each subgroup 
(e.g., human performance, weather, and materials) interpret the data presented. When 
applicable, the team translates the data for the NTSB board and makes recommendations 
for the transportation community. Sensemaking plays a valuable role because the NTSB 
board adjudicates. The process prohibits self-assessment and encourages debate and 
dissent in underlying causes.198 This process parallels peer review in academic journals 
and adds a high level of scrutiny and trust in the process. 
3. Dissemination 
The NTSB aims to produce a preliminary report within one to three weeks of an 
event. Dealing with issues related to safety makes fast learning essential since sifting 
through the time-sensitive facts takes time. Even with fully developed information, 
transmitting knowledge stocks to end-users is not immediate. Even though the NTSB 
compiles field notes into a preliminary report from the accident site, disseminating such 
notes to agency personnel not present on scene takes time. These preliminary reports also 
represent a low hurdle to obtain detailed and incident-specific information with a few clicks 
of a mouse or keyboard. The speed of dissemination is important. However, housing the 
information in one specific and expected location is equally important. That way, all 
involved understand where to look for it. 
The preliminary report, along with the future final report released in one to three 
years, also represents an official record of the investigation and a documented paper trail 
of the recommendations, whether implemented or not. This knowledge repository allows 
for a wide body of data available to future investigators to apply to current practice. These 
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dissemination pathways also stipulate who is responsible for maintaining the learning data 
and allows for funding of such efforts. Ultimately, no matter how vast or detailed the 
archive is, a distribution and storage pathway must also be optimized to enhance both 
knowledge management and information transmission. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The NTSB has a significant institutional history of deploying to accident sites, 
completing technical investigations, and reporting key findings that often spur change in 
the transportation industry that can be modeled by the HSE. Given the timeliness of the Go 
Team response, swift data collection under chaotic event circumstances, the ability to 
quickly collect and make sense of data from multiple systems, and an established and 
effective route of dissemination, the NTSB model could be applied to other high-impact 
and complex incidents that require near real-time information and analysis to improve 
industry practices or processes.  
Such application warrants further study in how to adapt a transportation-based 
research model to other event types since modifications may be required. The board 
follows a coordinated and standardized process that is both repeatable for future incidents 
yet adaptable for each event according to differences in modes of transportation, the 
magnitude of the event or investigation, or the technical areas of inquiry to be examined. 
This standardization also allows for consistency when presenting data to all stakeholders, 
whether industry partners, media, family, or other government agencies. The case study 
does illustrate that it is indeed possible, with the proper resources, to perform near real-
time data collection and sensemaking in a meaningful fashion in a quasi-emergent 
environment. 
F. FINDINGS 
This thesis has demonstrated that strategic organizational learning principles do not 
exist in the HSE. Strategic learning “aims to generate learning in support of future strategic 
initiatives that will, in turn, foster knowledge asymmetries that can lead to differences in 
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organizational performance.”199 Given the stakes of the HSE, mainly lives and property, 
realizing optimized organizational learning requires greater systematic effort, including a 
more rapid tempo. Fast learning can be accomplished with multidisciplinary Go Teams 
using “a telescope, not a vacuum cleaner” approach, as in Haiti by CALL.200 A real-time 
learning approach should intersperse traditional learning tools, such as AARs, rather than 
replacing them. As Birkland summarizes, “The challenge for democracies is to create the 
sort of public pressure necessary to make learning processes more realistic and responsive 
to the problems and to the needs of the organizations, communities, regions, and nations in 
which these events occur.”201 Focusing on critical response areas (telescope), rather than 
sucking up any and all information (vacuum), is critical. The HSE Go Team concept 
models how to optimize organizational learning after an event.  
Organizations need to spearhead continuous learning from new threats before high-
threat events occur. Ultimately, the results show that homeland security learning lacks 
timeliness, a small, well-qualified group needs to exploit new knowledge and apply it 
within the context of the HSE, and effective dissemination must be measured.202 
1. Ritualization/Cognitive Activation 
CALL, NTSB, and the HTI approach demonstrate stable, repeatable approaches to 
learning. Within the HSE environment, complex emergency services operations have a 
battle rhythm. Police, fire, and EMS break down critical job performance tasks into 
multiple steps, often using checklists for operations, training, and evaluation. The HSE 
learning environment lacks such standardization in what is to be learned from a high-threat 
event. Thus, lessons learned from one event cannot be generalized to the next. 
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As Snowden, creator of the Cynefin framework states, “Ritual is one of the most 
effective methods of changing cognitive activation.”203 Cognitive activation—the process 
by which the brain prepares itself to do a specific task, almost automatically—uses pattern 
matching and best-fit analysis to compete against differing decision pathways. Having pre-
established teams for organizational learning, such as CALL, the NTSB, and HTI, 
establishes cognitive activation. No equivalent entities drive cognitive activation for 
organizational learning in the HSE. 
2. Absorptive Capacity 
Cohen and Levinthal describe absorptive capacity as “the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends,” which also facilitates innovation.204 Total absorptive capacity represents prior 
knowledge known to the firm, research and development, and experience of the processes 
that support the product, such as manufacturing. Though the HSE does not encompass 
manufacturing, its learning and innovating require increasing absorptive capacity. If new 
domains require “diversity of knowledge,” such as the high-threat space, a “diverse 
background provides a more robust basis for learning because it increases the prospect that 
incoming information will relate to what is already known.”205 
The jurisdiction experiencing the event sometimes issues after-action reports. This 
self-assessment may involve not only conflicts of interest but also an absorptive capacity 
gap. The jurisdiction cannot know what it does not know. This organizational Johari 
window exacerbates an integrated multi-disciplinary response.206 Zahra and George’s 
expanded work may be most applicable for HSE organizational learning as they describe 
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absorptive capacity as “a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms 
acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational 
capability.”207 Establishing a multi-disciplinary team with a standardized and structured 
approach to learning from high-threat events would naturally increase HSE absorptive 
capacity. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.  
 —Aldous Huxley 
The data presented in the previous chapters demonstrate that near real-time data 
collection following a high-threat event is possible and that such data can be meaningful 
and accurate. The two case studies of CALL and the NTSB illustrate that systemic 
organizational learning practices contribute to both knowledge management and 
knowledge transfer. Therefore, the homeland security enterprise should evaluate ways in 
which to institutionalize organizational learning in a more meaningful fashion. This chapter 
summarizes best practices from the case studies, provides conclusions and 
recommendations on moving forward with quicker learning processes, and suggests further 
research for optimizing the HSE learning environment. 
A. RECOMMENDATION FOR A NEAR REAL-TIME LEARNING 
FRAMEWORK 
The near real-time HTI data collected immediately after the 1 October event 
suggest the HSE should establish an entity dedicated to optimizing data collection and 
analysis for national-level organizational learning. Two related federal precedents relate to 
this effort. First, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 seeks “to promote the 
security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation 
for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, 
or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”208 NSPD 44 directs the secretary of state to 
ensure this occurs in conjunction with an appointed coordinator for reconstruction and 
stabilization.  
Importantly, one of the mandates of this directive is to “identify lessons learned and 
integrate them into operations.”209 NSPD 44 suggests the criticality of a systems approach 
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to institutionalizing organizational learning for complex operations or, in the case of the 
HSE, complex incidents. The intent is also to capture verified procedures and incorporate 
responses into future deployments, suggesting organizational learning. Finally, the NSPD 
suggests the need for speed in the learning process as well as the implementation of other 
learning tools such as “gaming exercises, training, and after-action reviews,” which could 
be applicable in the HSE if there were a national coordinating authority.210 
Another precedent lies in Presidential Decision Directive 56. While not regulatory 
in nature, it is intended to represent best practices for managing complex military peace 
operations. Organizational learning is cited as a relevant task—especially learning from 
“crisis management procedures to ensure that we, as a government, are learning from our 
experiences with complex contingency operations and institutionalizing the lessons 
learned.”211 Both of these presidential documents set the stage for a structural mechanism 
for nationwide organization learning; however, more will be needed. 
A mandate to implement organizational learning from significant high-threat events 
must also be accompanied by a mandate for individual agencies involved to share data from 
the event. While some data would be publicly available to a research team, near real-time 
data would need to be in the form of interviews and accounts of responders. 
1. National-Level Learning Teams 
This thesis provides an analytical framework for future HSE organizational 
learning based on successful models. Although individual agencies may still produce 
official (and often self-assessed) after-action reports, near real-time learning from external 
SMEs must still optimize learning for the entire HSE within weeks, not years. 
By design, learning teams should be sufficiently broad and scalable for each event. 
Professional organizations for each discipline type (fire, EMS, law enforcement, and 
emergency management) could be combined to streamline the learning process. Functional 
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learning teams could also provide a structure for a deep pool of SMEs, grounded in the 
established learning methodology, for deployment. Although not comprehensive, the 
following discussion illustrates many best practices from the case studies and the 
scholarship and provides the foundation for a framework for quick learning from high-
threat events. 
2. Near Real-Time Incident Access 
CALL and the NTSB enculturate the near real-time learning process. CALL 
represents learning that is doctrinally approved, and the NTSB comes from a legislative 
mandate. Their official approval gives weight to the learning teams and their deployment. 
Having pre-established learning team roles, responsibilities, and structure eases this 
burden. Also, having personnel on the ground who expect to be contacted about a 
debriefing directly after an incident occurs ensures information can be captured quickly. 
Pre-event expectation setting potentially translates into rapid sensemaking and 
dissemination. If organizational learning is to be held in a higher regard for the HSE, the 
expectation for learning teams to be deployed after every significant high-threat incident 
should be institutionalized.  
As discussed in Chapter I, the traditional measure of organizational learning, the 
after-action report, takes a great deal of time to produce. Compressing this timeframe 
stands to benefit the community even if no overhauls to the organizational learning process 
are made. As Evans summarizes, “Organizations need to consider the dimensions of space 
and time when choosing appropriate learning approaches to maximize opportunities for 
knowledge transfer.”212 The value of being on the ground directly after a high-threat event 
cannot be overstated, as the causal relationships between networks (the interagency 
response) must be quickly explored.  
Near real-time data collection (proximity) also insulates sensemaking from political 
intrusion based on sensitivities stimulated by any jurisdiction. It also, much like the NTSB 
methods, reinforces the need for rapid sensemaking by experts and transmission of data 
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back to a centralized authority. This sensemaking is also articulated in the CALL process 
with rapid transmission back to headquarters and dissection by the learning team and 
analysts. As the HSE lacks this capability, getting near real-time data, processed through a 
sensemaking organization, would unequivocally add value to homeland security. If 
physical proximity is important to the organizational learning process, as suggested by Lee, 
temporal proximity must also be analyzed for accretive value.213 
3. Local-Level Learning Officers 
Successfully implementing organizational learning requires a bottom-up as well as 
a top-down approach. Much like other integrated efforts, it must represent the whole of 
community. This approach ensures both top-level structural support and boots on the 
ground buy-in. To that end, every professional law enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency 
management, and federal response agency must identify local learning officers to 
champion organizational learning. The HSE must replicate the learning officers (LOs) of 
both CALL and the NTSB to champion learning for the broader community.214 
These LOs would have several roles. First, they would be responsible for engaging 
national-level learning go-teams when deployed. Since local LOs would understand the 
local dynamics of who responded, what was or was not accomplished, and successes or 
failures, they could ready the scene for the learning team. Initial LO deployment to a high-
threat event would also parallel the NTSB’s initial stake-down process.215 Early LO 
deployment would relieve the go-team of the dual responsibilities of logistical concerns of 
getting to the site and arranging access to responders. 
Besides coordinating the responding post-event learning team and local assets, a 
local LO would also champion organizational learning with an agency. Obviously, given 
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the size of some of the larger organizations, multiple learning organizations may need to 
be appointed. As high-threat incidents occur nationally, LOs would be local points of 
contact, responsible for disseminating lessons observed or near real-time information for 
the agency. Having an engaged local LO would relieve a central organization from 
optimizing the learning process and disseminating first-responder intelligence. The LO 
would receive information from major incidents as well as timely research into novel 
tactical advances as they occur. Given the success of CALL’s push and pull methodology, 
discussed in Chapter III, learning officers would also be points of contact for the plethora 
of departments nationwide to submit questions. A fully structured national-level learning 
organization could then prioritize those requests for the HSE and conduct research or 
additional real-time learning to answer the question appropriately. 
Although all three case studies demonstrate organizational learning in a military or 
paramilitary environment, the CALL case study unequivocally shows the need for a 
specialized and formal organizational learning process. This is due to the speed with which 
learning needs to occur and the specialization needed to be effective. Moreover, it 
specifically highlights the need for both learning officers and specialized learning teams 
because organizational learning must be championed and integrated fully into the 
organizational ethos. Organizational learning for the HSE must itself become specialized, 
given the evolving and technical nature of the work requires such specialization.  
CALL shows that dedicated institutional learning officers who both manage and 
lead the learning process are a critical node for organizational learning. Learning officers 
help craft learning objectives to specify what needs capturing, coalesce a team to 
accomplish the objectives, and are responsible for making sense of data—ultimately 
converting the data into knowledge for dissemination. CALL, as an organization, uses 
specialized learning teams to deploy to active military engagements as well as training sites 
to collect data. At the end of the team-led process, information not only gets disseminated 
but often changes doctrinal processes. The instances in the Balkans and Somalia allowed 
the organization to pivot quickly in contrast to after-action reviews. Thus, HSE processes 
do not allow such nimbleness, nor do doctrinal changes frequently occur. Lessons learned 
from the high-threat Columbine massacre, for example, did not prompt changes to fire 
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service integration tactics until 15 years later.216 Thus, lessons not learned must end by 
applying new organizational learning tactics guided by an agency solely dedicated to this 
cause. 
4. Incubators and Advocacy Networks 
Incubators and advocacy networks contribute to doctrinal change because they 
allow for experimentation in a safe space and provide critical representation of new ideas 
within an organization. Jensen articulates these two concepts as they apply to the military 
environment.217 To use a Silicon Valley analogy, incubators are small, fast, and light 
entities that rapidly develop prototypes. In the military or HSE context, incubators are 
much the same, but they reside outside the big bureaucracy. Incubators set preconditions 
that allow for the acceptance of failure, iteration, and adaptation. Contextually, incubators 
could develop new tactics or confirm the effectiveness of current ones. Advocacy networks 
apply the experimentation of an incubator horizontally across an organization. Advocacy 
networks can also help to overcome cultural resistance to change. If “professional soldiers 
require these safe spaces to visualize new forms of warfare,” the HSE likewise requires 
space and time (incubators) along with a dedicated pipeline of professionals to advance 
issues in a scientifically rigorous manner.218 
Exploring new issues means more than just the deployment of a specialized team 
to a high-threat event and should include novel thinking during normal operations if the 
HSE is to learn both faster and better. The concept of incubation and advocacy networks 
is the applied learning required once knowledge is generated. For example, if a deployed 
go-team captured information about specific first-responder tactics that were used, those 
tactics should be tested against other available tactics to confirm efficiency or effectiveness 
through analysis and not anecdote. Understanding the limitations of current tactics or the 
                                               
216 William H. Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission 
(Denver: Columbine Review Commission, 2001). Note: Law enforcement tactics evolved quickly after this 
event, transitioning to immediate contact teams to address active threats; however, the first warm zone 
integration teams with fire and EMS providers did not evolve until 2011. 
217 Jensen, Forging the Sword, 1–2. 
218 Jensen, 2. 
91 
creation of new ones would be under the direct purview of incubators. Innovation in the 
HSE becomes especially important when dealing with interagency response as one 
response agency depends on another to complete mutual incident objectives. Warm zone 
integration is a prime example of interdependencies among multi-disciplinary agencies. 
The fire/EMS mission must be in close and constant coordination with police resources. 
Themes of both incubators and advocacy networks can be found in all of the 
examples provided. CALL, the NTSB, and the HTI each possess core elements. At CALL, 
in-field data collection leads to learning. That learning is a direct result of trying new tactics 
and procedures as well as using simulation and training to confirm or deny results.219 
CALL also acts as an advocacy network as the organizational structure points to CALL 
when there is a deficit in knowledge. CALL maintains a repository of information, so it 
continually acts as an advocate. 
The NTSB is undoubtedly an advocate for safety and assimilates learning from the 
quick collection of crash or accident evidence. The NTSB becomes the advocacy network 
for the improved safety process based on the learning process. It has simulation at its 
disposal when new procedures or processes need to be tested and is a small unit separate 
from heavily regulated and burdened big government. 
The HTI acts as an incubator focusing on new and novel threat types and proposing 
additional tactics and procedures to meet them. As a newly formed organization, it has 
established advocacy networks from the professional organizations of its members. It has 
also acted as an incubator proposing and executing on near real-time data collection from 
the 1 October incident. Regarding doctrinal change performed by the initial work of 
incubators, Jensen writes, “Size matters. Small proved beautiful. Some of the most 
innovative work and imaginative thinking was done by small cohorts.”220 The potential for 
incubators and advocacy networks, even small ones in the HSE, should not be 
underestimated. The HTI model also exhibits signs of “infection pathways” within the 
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advocacy network by connecting distant points of information with communities of 
interest.221 “As military professionals develop new theories of victory they need to reach 
beyond their immediate peers to infect the larger institution,” says Jensen; the HSE, too, 
needs to broadly influence communities of interest that are not directly related to the 
learning opportunity.222 Specific to high-threat learning, the HTI acted as a “connecting 
agent,” creating a pathway for near real-time learning to reach the broader HSE.223 
Whether one considers the properties of incubators, advocacy networks, or 
connecting agents, the cases demonstrate pieces of all three in the context of organizational 
learning. To advance the HSE in knowledge capture, information distillation, and 
dissemination of lessons from major events, elements of all three should be imitated. 
B. SUMMARY 
Given the rate and magnitude of change, organizational learning systems should be 
implemented to address what Jones and Mahon term high-velocity/turbulent environments 
(HVTEs) for the HSE. High-threat events align with HVTEs because “change is rapid, 
large and discontinuous.”224 Learning during these types of events can be plotted as a 
continuum ranging from adaptation to innovation.225 However, for organizational learning 
from an HVTE, “the time between when something is learned and applied must be greatly 
compressed”—if the HSE wants to address novel threats and tactics.226 Thus, achieving 
organizational learning in the homeland security enterprise must address both individual 
and organizational learning. Both must be responsible for knowledge transference such that 
organizations “will be asked to deliver just-in-time learning, devise mechanisms for 
helping people learn at the point of action from their own experiences and create 
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mechanisms for transferring experience and knowledge from one part of the organization 
to another.”227 
Multiple organizations with different responsibilities and scopes make it necessary 
for each one (EMS, fire, and police) to learn for itself. Likewise, the coordination of those 
agencies demands that the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, a nonprofit, or 
scholars need to manage a knowledge transmission process. Jones and Mahon observe that 
“one of the challenges of management is to recognize that decisions in high 
velocity/turbulent environments cannot wait for complete information and knowledge—it 
is the ability to combine explicit knowledge and limited information with tacit knowledge 
that yields unique breakthrough solutions.”228 Given the inherent incompleteness of 
information during HVTEs, traditional government organizations will be reluctant to 
release incomplete response data even though this type of information may contain the 
most useful incident intelligence. In the HSE’s case, this knowledge chasm, between what 
is known immediately and what is known in the long term, shows little difference on either 
side.229 The key element needed to connect the two is speed, structured within a systemic 
process built specifically for HSE organizational learning. 
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, LIMITATIONS, 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
True ignorance is not the absence of knowledge, but the refusal to acquire 
it.  
 —Karl Popper 
A. IMPLEMENTATION 
Several barriers inhibit national-level organizational learning in the HSE. They 
include a legitimate mandate to include learning as a competency for response agencies; 
indemnification, so professional responders feel free to discuss issues openly without fear 
of retribution; and the significant problem of collective action.230 Identifying these barriers 
and working to minimize them will enhance efforts to optimize organizational learning for 
the HSE. 
1. Lack of Legislative Mandate 
Information sharing has long been cited as an impediment to organizational 
learning in the homeland security environment.231 In this context, The 9-11 Commission 
Report assessed that the nation needed to pivot from a culture of “need to know” to “need 
to share” after the intelligence and information sharing failures leading up to the attack.232 
Although this requirement to share applies to prevention efforts for the HSE, lessons not 
learned pervade major homeland security events. Most certainly, learning efforts could be 
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increased if some level of mandate existed. The problem of lessons not learned is so 
pervasive among the HSE that the contents of the next after-action report are jokingly said 
to exist before the next event occurs if incident command and communication are included 
as topic areas. Standing or recurring topic areas for the next after-action report suggest a 
broken organizational learning environment for the current HSE. 
In our federal system with 50,000 police, fire, EMS, and emergency management 
agencies in the United States, conducting an after-action review lies with local agencies. 
National disasters or those with national security implications such as 9-11 have risen to 
the level of a federal mandate. However, significant incidents with homeland security 
implications run the gamut. Some incidents receive extensive scrutiny while others receive 
less or none at all.233 Some are self-assessed, and some are independently assessed.234 
Standardizing what incidents are scrutinized and how they are studied, especially focusing 
on a mechanism that discourages self-rating by the involved jurisdictions, is paramount.  
Agencies might be reluctant to share for several reasons, including liability 
concerns and privacy issues. Both would need to be mitigated with a sharing mandate. The 
mandate to share ultimately drives the organizational learning process, which transcends 
any one agency, locality, or department. Raising the competency level of the entire HSE, 
could potentially pay significant dividends toward future lifesaving efforts as threat actors 
and their tactics evolve. A mandate for post-event sharing of information could be tied to 
the acceptance of grant funds currently administered by the government. Similar 
mechanisms have already been placed by the Department of Homeland Security mandating 
the use of the incident command system.235 
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2. Indemnification 
Indemnification of public agencies from tort or liability claims may become a 
barrier to organizational learning if not addressed. An agency chief or municipal head 
might not make personnel available if he thinks that the data collected could result in 
litigation. Yet without internal pressure, responders are willing, even eager, to discuss their 
response when framed as an organizational and national learning opportunity. 
The 2001 anthrax attacks brought indemnification into focus as a part of the larger 
national conversation around bio-preparedness and readiness for terrorism. The Code of 
Federal Regulations allows the president to amend contractual language, even if it 
contradicts other law when needed in the name of national defense practices, in relation to 
medicines and vaccines needed for recovery from a biological weapons attack.236 This 
preparedness would include the indemnification of liability from adverse effects. 
The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act 
of 2002 assuages liability concerns for first-responder emerging technologies. The 
SAFETY Act “provides important legal liability protections for providers of Qualified 
Anti-Terrorism Technologies—whether they are products or services. The goal of the 
SAFETY Act is to encourage the development and deployment of new and innovative anti-
terrorism products and services by providing liability protections.”237 Although these 
current laws address therapeutics and equipment, if knowledge of significant events could 
be protected for near real-time organizational learning, one might see the application. 
Exemptions could be carved out for standard issues such as neglect, malice, or gross 
incompetence. 
3. Collective Action  
Organizational learning from large-scale, high-threat events suffers from a 
collective-action problem. In it, an academic institution, government agency, or a 
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structured collection of informed responders must champion the process for the HSE, 
which requires an investment of time and resources. Even if an organization performs its 
own assessment of an event, ensuring the learning process works for the rest of the HSE 
community exceeds its reach. Further, such an agency has no incentive to fully disseminate 
information to the broader community outside the agencies that experienced the event. 
This lack of information distillation suggests that an ordered approach must be 
created for HSE organizational learning. This ordered approach must be actively managed 
by a new entity dedicated solely to its cause. Like CALL or the NTSB, the HSE enterprise 
must view knowledge and information as “communal property rather than a source of 
individual power.”238 An independent agency responsible for learning relieves the burden 
of information collection, sensemaking, and dissemination to the departments involved and 
initially onto the learning team. Any agency involved could conduct AARs later, if 
warranted. A designated learning team would prevent self-scoring of the event, providing 
greater external validity for the entire HSE. 
4. Contingency on Grant Funding  
The collective-action problem of organizational learning entails delineating 
responsibility for coordinating and budgeting this effort. This research indicates that 
organizational learning can be accomplished in a more effective and structured manner and 
yield positive results for the HSE. The question is, who funds the effort? 
Although this thesis provides a framework to facilitate organizational learning, 
funding the effort falls outside its scope. But mechanisms exist to compel effort. By 
establishing an individual agency, learning officers could be contingent on the massive 
amount of grant funding in the HSE. Through the Department of Justice grants, Urban Area 
Security Initiative funds, State Homeland Security Grant Program, Staffing for Adequate 
Fire and Emergency Response, and Assistance to Firefighter Grants, the federal 
government supplies funding to police, fire, EMS, and emergency management agencies. 
Much like continued grant funding is contingent on the adoption of the Incident Command 
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System by all agencies, organizational learning could become the federal government’s 
unfunded mandate. Practically, this means that agencies establish a point of contact for 
organizational learning, which most likely means another “other duty as assigned” for most 
smaller agencies. However, this assignment represents an opportunity to contribute to the 
goal of optimizing HSE practice, which also benefits the locality. Organizational learning 
structured in this way also aligns with a give-to-get approach. Agencies willing to share 
information also receive information and can optimize based on sensemaking they might 
otherwise not receive. 
All in all, as Dyson has previously espoused in relation to the military, “without the 
correct organizational processes and activities, military adaptation can be blocked, or the 
wider lessons from adaptation can easily be lost, leading to the need to relearn lessons in 
the field, often at great human and financial cost.”239 This thesis argues that paramilitary 
organizations such as police, fire, EMS, and emergency management are no different. The 
lack of any institutional or formal learning management processes suggests a gap that must 
be immediately addressed to continue the missions of saving lives and property. In the 
absence of a quick formalized method to rapidly learn, the HSE will repeat past 
shortcomings, lack innovation, and be unable to adapt tactics rapidly. The ability of the 
HSE to establish lessons learned, rather than just lessons observed, has not been given 
sufficient coverage in the literature. This thesis contends that templates such as CALL or 
the NTSB, from which the HTI processes came, should be tested to increase national-level 
organizational learning from high-threat events. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The most serious limitation to organizational learning relates to leadership. 
Although a true discussion of the leadership needed lies beyond the scope of this thesis, 
leadership must be exerted across stratified levels of government to realize organizational 
learning. In one of the most famous, and deadly, wildland fires in recent history, the 
iconography of “dropping tools” was used to demonstrate the actions needed for 
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firefighters to save themselves from an on-coming flame front.240 The firefighters who 
followed the tacit knowledge of their senior crew boss and dropped their tools quickly 
outran the fire and saved themselves. Those who did not ditch their gear perished.  
Although the need to improve organizational learning extends beyond the fire 
service, the HSE needs to drop current tools and implement new methods to learn from 
high-threat events, at all costs. This process will require “meta-leadership” on a scale not 
previously realized.241 Articulated differently,  
in the development of any effective knowledge management capability, 
leadership is important. . . . It is the leadership team that needs to keep 
the flexibility and relevance of tacit knowledge processes alive in the 
organization and to demonstrate by their own actions that tacit 
knowledge and its transfer is important.242 
The adaptive leadership must enculturate organizational learning for the enterprise, not just 
a specific silo or discipline; high-threat response is multi-disciplinary in nature and 
organizational learning for the HSE must be, too.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research proposes a novel approach to organizational learning after a 
significant high-threat event has occurred. However, how best to optimize the 
dissemination of knowledge or any lessons learned still needs to be assessed. Also, the 
degree to which the HSE can increase organizational learning in day-to-day circumstances 
is not well understood in the literature. The work above describes inter-disaster learning 
whereas long-duration events might also require intra-disaster learning, which is also 
unexplored here. 
Implementing a national framework for learning will require future research, too. 
This framework might include an analysis of the effectiveness of a deployed learning team. 
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Potentially, an effort could be made to standardize a base set of questions for each 
discipline at a high-threat event. Standard questions would prove useful for a comparative 
analysis of multiple events and individual discipline response mechanics. Some effort is 
underway nationally for standardized after-action review questions for hostile events; 
however, no enforcement mechanism is in place.243 This effort to standardize questions 
could streamline the process for multiple teams to be activated for specific disciplines and 
warrants future research. 
Finally, the stories of survivors sometimes capture the success and failure of 
emergency response systems. Notionally, these stories include important data points to 
consider in streamlining response practices, such as motivating factors of survival versus 
non-survival, self-provided medical care, civilian-provided medical care to others injured 
before professional help arrives, and concurrence or rejection of common public policy 
protection strategies such as Run, Hide, Fight. While this research concentrates on high-
threat events, learning across many different areas within the HSE could be enhanced. 
Practitioners and scholars would also have the opportunity to compare and contrast 
incidents in a standardized fashion if a common framework for learning were employed. 
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APPENDIX. COMPARISON OF FINDINGS 
Table 3. General Incident Response Findings 
Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
1 After the original shooting, 
police received multiple calls 
of additional shooters. 
“Many responding officers reported that multiple distraction 
calls were heard over the radio, and they felt as if Las Vegas 
was experiencing a Mumbai-type of incident.34 Reports of 
active shooters as well as suspicious people, backpacks, and 
vehicles were coming in from all over the Las Vegas Strip.”1 
Interviewee stated many wounded went back 
to various hotels with GSWs and called 
9-1-1. Police and fire initially believed it was 
a complex coordinated attack due to the 
number of reports across multiple venues. 
2 The assailant actively 
surveilled police response 
and anticipated tactics. 
“Officers attempted to enter the hallway to the 100 wing from 
the 32nd floor stairwell but were delayed entry due to the door 
being secured with a silver metal ‘L’ bracket. . . . Upon opening 
this door, they discovered a metal food cart, five to seven feet 
away, draped with a white tablecloth, dishes, and what appeared 
to be an improvised explosive device (IED) and a black 
recording device. Several wires were observed on the cart 
leading back into Room 32-134. Concerned there was an IED on 
the food cart, the officers developed a tactical plan.”2 
Interviewee reported a video feed from the 
hallway into the assailant’s room. 
3 Accurate victim counts and 
patterns of injury were 
captured. 
“The gunfire began at approximately 10:05 p.m. and continued 
for over 10 minutes, with an excess of 1,000 rounds fired from 
various rifles from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort 
and Casino. The tragic result was the loss of 58 innocent lives 
and over 850 injured attendees.”3 
Approx. 1200 rounds of .223 and .308 
caliber rounds. Possibly .273 caliber as well. 
They think approximately 700 pounds of 
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Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
4 Planning efforts for the music 
festival were dictated by the 
number of personnel assigned 
to special events planning. 
“On October 1, 2017, LVMPD’s Events Planning Section was 
composed of one lieutenant, one sergeant, eight police officers, 
and three civilian support staff members.”4 
The police department has nine full-time 
special events officers, and the fire 
department has zero full-time personnel 
dedicated for special events. 
5 An insider presence helped to 
narrow the location of the 
shooter for the authorities. 
“While walking toward Center Core, Security Officer Campos 
heard gunfire coming from Room 32-135 and ran down the 
hallway. Security Officer Campos realized he was shot in his 
left calf as he took cover in the alcove of rooms 32-122 and 32-
124. Using both his radio and cell phone, Security Officer 
Campos advised the security dispatcher he had been shot in the 
leg.”5 
A security guard for Mandalay Bay 
apparently rattled the door knob of the 
shooter’s room, and the gunman shot through 
the door and the security guard was hit in the 
shoulder. We believe the security guard 
radioed this in and gave an accurate location 
of the shooter to the police. 
6 Recognizing the initial 
response dynamics of 
responding officers pursuing 
the immediate threat afforded 
general situational awareness. 
“The collection of officers who arrived at the 32nd floor 
stairwell consisted of several different units, uniformed patrol 
officers, plainclothes investigators, a K-9 supervisor, and a 
specialty trained SWAT breacher.”6 
The SWAT team reported to be on Floor 32 
was just two SWAT operators, a patrol 
officer, and one canine officer. 
7 Incursion onto the active 
runway at McCarran 
International Airport had 
significant response 
implications.  
“At approximately 10:30 p.m., attendees fled the festival toward 
McCarran International Airport. LVMPD Air Support was 
advised of this development and broadcasted over the CCAC 
radio channel that multiple people were running across the 
runways.”7 
Two patients were driven to the firehouse at 
the airport. The vehicle broke through 
security and drove across two active airstrips 
to get to the firehouse. Subsequently, we find 
out through open-source, the shooter shot the 
fuel tanks with two rounds at the airport. 
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Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
8 The planning for the after-
action review began 
immediately.  
“The Fire Chief assigns four CCFD members to an AAR team. 
Several days later, LVMPD adds three members to this team 
and the Route 91 Task Force is created.”8 
The Fire Department assembled and detailed 
an AAR team two days after the incident. 
9 The hotel prompted a 
response to the assailant’s 
room. This information was 
conveyed via building 
intelligence from inside the 
room, which was monitored 
at a central control panel. 
“On October 1, 2017, at approximately 2118 hours, Mandalay 
Bay Security Officer Jesus Campos was assigned to check 
several Hotel Service Optimization System (HotSOS) alarms 
from various rooms inside the hotel. Room 32-129 was the last 
of the rooms Security Officer Campos was assigned to check.”9 
It is the hotel policy to send one security 
officer to check smoke alarms or other 
problems prior to calling 9-1-1. 
10 Establishing facts of how the 
incident unfolded and what 
unit actions occurred gives 
preliminary data to assess 
response effectiveness. 
“In addition to taking fire and rendering medical aid, many 
officers who worked the festival formed strike teams to clear the 
venue for additional threats and search the venue for 
survivors.”10  
Metro uses X [number redacted to maintain 
operational security] strike teams of officers. 




                                               
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, B-5. 
9 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, LVMPD Preliminary Investigative Report, 5. A HotSOS is an alarm that is activated in a central monitoring 
station when the occupant leaves the hotel door open for a specified timeframe. 
10 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 26. 
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Table 4. Medical Findings 
Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
1 Bleeding control equipment, 
specifically tourniquets, 
were not personally carried 
by the police. 
“Operational readiness was hindered for the overtime officers assigned to 
the interior of the event, as their equipment was in vehicles parked at a 
church approximately 250-350 yards away.”11 “Working officers had 
access to at least one tourniquet in each patrol or unmarked police 
vehicle.”12 
Metro (Police Department) is 
provided tourniquets, but they’re 
not required to wear it on their 
body. 
2 Law enforcement provided 
immediate support to area 
hospitals to assist with scene 
stabilization and hospital 
security. 
“Assigning LVMPD captains to local area hospitals was beneficial in 
establishing command at and around hospital locations to maintain site 
security and communicate with hospital administrators. These assignments 
also facilitated quick access for doctors and nurses, with credentials, into 
hospitals under tightened security following the mass shooting.”13 
Law enforcement set up a one-
block perimeter around the 
hospital, and the interviewee was 
checked three times upon arrival. 
He said the hospital was back to 
normal operations by about 4:30 
a.m. 
3 Despite limited time, 
information, and access, 
authorities conducted a 
fairly accurate patient count. 
“Of the over 870 documented survivors who suffered injuries, 400 
suffered injuries as a result of gunshot wounds and/or shrapnel, and 360 of 
those documented survivors were injured in ways other than by gunshot 
wounds and/or shrapnel, and 95 survivors suffered documented injuries 
categorized as unknown.”14  
147 patients were transported by 
EMS, the rest by a privately owned 
vehicle. 527 injured, 59 dead. Most 
of the injuries were shrapnel 
injuries. 
  
                                               
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 23. 
12 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 98. 
13 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 54. 
14 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 109. 
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Table 5. Integration Findings 
Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
1 Deployed rescue task forces 
had limited utility in this 
particular incident, 
identifying accountability 
and discipline of response as 
concerns. 
“Two hours after the shots were fired, just after midnight, Unified 
Command broadcast ‘no more hot zones,’ so RTFs were officially able to 
enter the festival lot. An RTF is a combination of fire department and law 
enforcement personnel with the tactical objective of rescuing victims. This 
team consists of three or more fire personnel (one paramedic and one 
company officer) and two or more armed law enforcement officers. 
However, unbeknownst to Unified Command, the RTFs had already 
formed and entered the festival lot (a hot zone) to search for survivors 
before permission was given. This response into a hot zone did not follow 
standard protocol as listed in the Fire Department’s Hostile MCI Policy.”15 
RTFs self-deployed from the 
staging area once operations got 
heated. Four RTFs were set up and 
ready to go very quickly into the 
incident. 
2 All warm zones are not 
created alike, and specific 
tactics must be adjusted 
based on incident dynamics. 
“Route 91’s approximately 17.5- acre venue plot is assembled directly 
across from the Mandalay Bay and the Luxor Hotel & Casino and is one of 
two open-air venues on the Las Vegas Strip. . . . The venue was 
accommodating over 22,000 attendees.”16 
Interviewee asked back to the 
research team, “Where is the warm 
zone for an open-air venue?”  
3 Rescue task forces operated 
in multiple zones of threat. 
“Fire department Rescue Task Force team members operated outside of the 
Southern Nevada Fire Operations Hostile MCI policy to address supervisor 
shortages.”17 
Four RTFs were set up and ready 
to go very quickly into the 
incident. Fire department personnel 
were pushing to be deployed. 
  
                                               
15 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 27. 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 7. 
17 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 27. 
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Table 6. Incident Command Findings 
Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
1 The unified command 
established suffered specific 
challenges related to this 
complex incident but ones not 
easily anticipated.  
“The CCFD Incident Commander was unable to leave his 
command vehicle because he needed to monitor radio traffic 
on multiple channels simultaneously. This confinement to 
his vehicle created initial challenges in establishing Unified 
Command with LVMPD.”18 
It took about 10–15 minutes to set up a unified 
command. PD had set up an incident command for 
the special event at the police substation. A 
Battalion Chief [name redacted] was the fire 
department incident command but was required to 
listen to four radios channels simultaneously. As 
such, he was unable to move to the unified 
command. Chief [name redacted] ended up going 
to unified command inside the substation and he 
assigned [name redacted] as the operations chief. 
2 Prior to the shooting, the fire 
department was not 
represented in the command 
post.  
“Prior to the incident, command was not unified at the Route 
91 Harvest Festival. LVMPD and Community Ambulance 
were both operating in the venue as planned; however, 
CCFD was not integrated into the special event plans or 
operations. The Route 91 Harvest Festival did not integrate 
CCFD into the on-scene festival command post for the 
special event, as there is no ordinance or requirement that 
mandates a venue to include fire personnel in event plans or 
operations.”19 
Metro police are mandated by law to have a 
command component at the special event. There is 
no requirement to have fire involved. EMS is 
usually contracted for special events, but it doesn’t 
sound like they are well integrated into the 
command structure for special events. 
3 Initial command post for both 
police and fire became the hot 
zone. 
“The LVMPD CCAC Captain notified officers over the radio 
that he was en route to South Central Area Command, which 
was the location he chose for the formal Incident Command 
Post (ICP). He also communicated initial information to Las 
Vegas Strip properties. Upon arrival at South Central Area 
Command, he assumed the role of Unified Incident 
Commander with CCFD personnel.”20 
Outside the venue, there was a series of trailers, 
and that is where the police incident command for 
the concert was set up (prior to the shooting). 
                                               
18 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 30. 
19 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 11. 
20 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 30. 
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Table 7. Community Recovery Findings 
Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
1 The city quickly stood up a 
family assistance center (FAC). 
“In the days following, LVFR staff assisted in establishing the Family 
Assistance Center and the Vegas Strong Resiliency Center and 
provided staffing resources.”21 
They said it will take 48 hours or so to 
really ramp up the FAC, and as of now, 
which is two days into it, very few people 
have used the services. They anticipate 
that will increase. 
2 Donations at the FAC require 
management. 
“The community response to assist after 1 October was impressive. 
Citizens, local businesses, and corporations donated essentials such as 
food, water, and hydrating beverages to first responders. LVMPD’s 
coordination and communication during this time was extremely 
important in receiving these kinds of donations.”22 
The FAC has a lot of various services and 
responsibilities related to the incident, 
one of which is donation management. 
The public is sending anything and 
everything. Much of the stuff that is being 
donated is random and perishable. 
3 The FAC is a complicated 
resource working to help mitigate 
the event. Las Vegas requested 
SMEs early to assist with setting 
up and optimizing the work of the 
FAC for this mass-casualty event. 
“FBI agents from the Orlando, Florida Field Office, who were 
involved in the response to the Pulse Nightclub shooting, flew to Las 
Vegas to provide support and assistance. The FBI’s expertise in 
setting up and maintaining an FAC became a model for Las Vegas 
and was instrumental to its success. In order to facilitate support and 
connections, exchange critically important information, answer 
questions, and make referrals, it was essential to create the FAC 
quickly in the aftermath of the mass-casualty incident.”23 
They immediately called for assistance 
from Orlando, and two people 
immediately flew out to Vegas to assist.24 
  
                                               
21 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 90. 
22 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 95. 
23 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 112. 
24 This detail is incorrect in the LVMPD’s OAR. 
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Table 8. Specialized Response Findings 
Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
1 Distractor events called out the 
bomb squad to investigate. 
“LVMPD Communications received a call of a 
suspicious vehicle (a black Audi bearing Nevada plates) 
at the Luxor Hotel and Casino valet, possibly with an 
explosive device. An LVMPD strike team composed of 
a SWAT sergeant, SWAT officer, and a few patrol 
officers were deployed to assess the suspicious vehicle 
before additional resources were summoned. As a result, 
All Hazard Regional Multi-Agency Operations and 
Response (ARMOR) was contacted. The LVFR Bomb 
Squad and the FBI deployed resources to the suspicious 
vehicle as well. It was later discovered that the vehicle 
was an autonomous (self-driving/driverless) vehicle.”25 
The bomb squad went to the Luxor casino for a 
suspicious vehicle with wires sticking out of it. The 
device was described as a can of some sort in the car 
about the size of a tuna can. It was possibly a VBIED, so 
people started running away from the vehicle. 
Subsequently, the responders found out that people were 
running because of hearing the gunshots. Initial 
investigation revealed a possible autonomous vehicle for 
the specific type of vehicle described, which ended up 
being a good intent call with no hazards found. 
2 The assailant had explosives in 
his vehicle.  
“A search warrant was obtained and at 0325 hours, 
detectives with the LVMPD All-Hazard Regional Multi-
agency Operations and Response Section (ARMOR) 
broke a window to the vehicle, to allow an explosive 
detection dog access to the scent from inside the vehicle. 
A U.S. Marshall explosive detection K9 moved around 
the vehicle and gave an alert to the presence of 
explosive precursors.”26 
Law enforcement located the suspect’s vehicle and an 
agent breaks the back window of the vehicle to insert 
[name redacted] bomb dog. The dog hits on the vehicle. 
Three duffel bags of various equipment and supplies are 
present. There are over 100 pounds of Tannerite in the 
vehicle, and the vehicle is two floors below grade in the 
parking garage. The vehicle was valeted by the assailant 
and was reversed into the parking spot. This made access 
challenging. Also, the distance to the vehicle and being 
surrounded by concrete prevented remote control of a 
robot via radio signal, which required or necessitated a 
hands-on approach. It was too long of a distance to use 
wired controls. The vehicle was not backed up all the 
way, so there was room to access the interior by opening 
the back hatch. The bomb technician manually pulled the 
duffel bags out of the back and x-rayed the contents. 
 
                                               
25 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 31. 
26 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, LVMPD Preliminary Investigative Report, 50. 
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Finding # Finding OAR HTI 
3 Law enforcement found the 
shooter dead after a prolonged 
period of being barricaded and 
quiet. The bomb squad was not 
used in the shooter’s room.  
“11:20 p.m. An explosive breach was conducted on the 
door to Room 32-135. The shooter was found with a 
self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.”27 
The interviewee stated that they ran a bomb dog in the 
shooter’s room and that law enforcement did not contact 
the bomb squad for assistance in the shooter’s room. 
4 The assailant fashioned a 
makeshift device to protect his 
air supply from either 
propellant being fired or gas 
potential deployed by police 
personnel. The assailant was 
also prepared to extinguish a 
fire if needed, using equipment 
not commonly found in a hotel 
room, suggesting he also 
brought the extinguisher with 
him. 
“A blue plastic tube, was fashioned with a fan on one 
end and a snorkel mouthpiece on the other end.”28 “At 
the southwest corner of the bar was a sink. There were 
two loaded rifle magazines and a ‘Tundra’ fire 
extinguisher on the sink counter.”29 “On 09-15-17, 
searches were performed for ‘swat weapons,’ ‘ballistics 
chart 308,’ ‘SWAT Las Vegas,’ ‘ballistic,’ and ‘do 
police use explosives.’30 
Assailant had a device to pressurize or scrub the air for 
gunpowder so as not to set off smoke or fire alarms or 
provide air in the case gas was used. 
 
 
                                               
27 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 1 October After-Action Report, 21. 
28 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, LVMPD Preliminary Investigative Report, 50. 
29 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 40. 
30 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 46. 
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